

# U.S.I. JOURNAL

**INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS**

(Established : 1870)



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- North Korea's Nuclear Programme and Its Impacts on Regional Security - Major General Hoang Ky Lan, PhD

**JANUARY-MARCH 2017**



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
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<sup>1</sup> Michael Baxandall, *Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy : A Primer in the Social History of Pictorial Style*, (Oxford University Press, London, 1988), p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> Lina Bolzoni and Pietro Corsi, *The Culture Memory*, (Bologna : Societa editrice il Mulino, 1992), p. 45.

2. Use of *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, and *loc. cit.*

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<sup>4</sup> R Poirer, *Learning Physics*, (Academic, New York, 1993), p.4.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>6</sup> T Eliot, *Astrophysics*, (Springer, Berlin, 1989), p. 141.

<sup>7</sup> R Millan, *Art of Latin Grammar*, (Academic, New York, 1997), p.23.

<sup>8</sup> Eliot, *op. cit.*, p.148.

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## Editorial

The case of India and China is unique as the two civilisation states not only share 3488 km of contiguous land border and have also fought a war in 1962 over disputed boundary issues, but are also the fastest emerging economic powerhouses in the world today. While China initiated market reforms in 1978 and has achieved economic growth averaging ten per cent annually; India has not been able to keep pace with its neighbour leading to a trade differential of USD 52 billion in favour of China. Although according to an estimate, China's economic growth in coming years may slow down to 5-6 per cent and India's will continue to grow at more than seven per cent, India would still achieve a GDP of USD 3.6 trillion as compared to that of USD 16.2 trillion of China by the year 2020. Can the aspiring India afford to overlook this lacuna? If the answer is 'No', then by when will our economy permit us to shape our neighbourhood and bridge the gap in our defence capabilities vis-à-vis China? To answer some of these concerns, the USI invited Dr Sanajaya Baru, former Media Adviser to the Prime Minister and a Professor of Economics to deliver a talk on 'Comparing the Economies of China and India and its Impact on India's Strategic and Security Interests', the text of which is being carried as the first article in this Issue. Dr Baru did not mince his words while stating that though there is no gainsaying the fact that there is a need to boost up our defence capabilities; but as far as China is concerned, it is going to be our biggest economic challenge in at least next ten years as against the popular discourse of it being primarily a military threat.

The next article again is text of a talk delivered by Lieutenant General DS Hooda, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM and Bar (Retired), former Army Commander, Northern Command, on the most contemporary and relevant topic of national importance and security concern i.e. the "Situation in Jammu and Kashmir : The Way Forward". The General routed his analysis of the current levels of insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) through the path of historical developments spanning almost 27 years. He was most insightful and pragmatic in spelling out the fact that the solution to the J&K problem was neither simple nor early to come by. He rather warned against falling for quick-fix solutions and suggested

some practical steps that ought to be taken by the political and military leaders and other stakeholders that would bring stability in the State, which could be further utilized to work out long-term solutions. Shri Anil Goswami, IAS (Retired), former Home Secretary of India, chaired the talk and added immense value to the discussion by bringing in the political perspective.

Pakistan has made no secret of its desire to counter Indian superiority in conventional forces with nuclear deterrence. Asymmetric warfare, nuclear blackmail, stated nuclear policy and lately, miniaturisation of warheads have been cornerstones of this strategy. It is also aware of Indian Naval capabilities and to counter that, has taken steps to focus on developing sea-based tactical nuclear assets. In her article, "Pakistan's Sea-based Nuclear Deterrence : Implications for India", Dr Roshan Khanijo has rightly pointed out the fact that just as tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) on land created a dilemma for Pakistan; Submarine Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) trajectory is going to create some challenges for them. Since these assets will have to be launch-ready prior to departure from the port, the danger of loss of command and control, accidental launches, risk of theft, sabotage by terrorists on account of their radical ideological thinking, are immense. Indian policy makers will do well by contemplating and examining complexities of Pak's nuclear strategy.

India has been on the forefront of UN peacekeeping operations right since its Independence. There are numerous studies on how to address the challenges that plague the peacekeeping missions. Mandate formulation is a diplomatic exercise and during the stage of implementation, the mandate and the principles of peacekeeping tend to get interpreted differently by various stakeholders and troop/ police contributing countries and, therefore, ambiguity prevails. While ambiguity needs to be addressed, Major General AK Bardalai, VSM (Retd) in his article - "UNPKO and Military Contribution: Challenges and Opportunities for Asia-Pacific Governments" highlights that there are opportunities to cooperate between the countries of the Asia-Pacific Region for the common objective of peace and stability in the world.

North Korea with its stated capabilities of attacking South Korea, Japan and US bases in the Pacific, is trying to send a

message – ‘Lay off or Else.....’. The deterrent effect has been demonstrated time and again to reinforce this thought; but this brinkmanship has dangerous consequences. Major General Hoang Ky Lan, PhD has amply brought out in his article “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme and Its Impacts on Regional Security”, the perceived need of North Korea to possess nuclear weapons; the complicated developments likely in Korean peninsula and its strategic impact on regional security. The General, whose country, Vietnam, is directly affected, feels that this may plunge the region into a real war.

Much has been heard about China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and One Belt One Road (OBOR) to develop infrastructure capabilities in our neighbourhood. The article “China Pakistan Economic Corridor – Current Status with Focus on Energy Sector” by Commander MH Rajesh concludes that CPEC is more about energy and less about the corridor per se – a view point well-articulated by facts and figures. A whopping 79 percent share (USD 33098 mn for this alone) - compared to 2 percent (USD 796.2 mn) for development of Gwadar Port - says it all! He has also brought out that with the project spilling over into POK – it will be politically vulnerable without taking Indian concerns into account. The article attempts to inform the readers about the salience of energy content without discounting its strategic importance.

National Power and Comprehensive National Power (CNP) have been defined by Western powers and China, but none explains the usage of CNP that a state possesses, what should this power achieve and how. Explaining “*Saptanga*” model of CNP by Kautilya, the author Lieutenant Colonel Malay Mishra in “Unique Approach to Comprehensive Power through the Lens of Kautilya’s Arthshastra”, has brought out uniqueness of the model and feels it is more comprehensive as it goes beyond to cater for certain intangibles that play key role in manifestation of state power. It also makes “*Saptanga*” unique and honorably comprehensive.

Major General KK Pant in his article, “Trade and Economic Sanctions – Effectiveness and Evil of Sanctions”, has amply brought out the range of sanctions under UN Chapter VII, the rationale thereof and effectiveness or otherwise of these sanctions on some of the countries by quoting concrete examples. He brings

out that if the preconditions that are morally acceptable are not fulfilled – sanctions will, by and large fail to achieve the stated objectives. Since economic sanctions appear to be the established response to situations involving violence or a risk of violence, these must comply with applicable rules of human rights and International Humanitarian Law. These should be crafted in a way that they do not endanger lives or health of the population of target state.

One of the most visible evidences of having arrived on the scene as a major power in the comity of nations is to be a permanent member of UN Security Council – with Veto power. India's desire of achieving this status dates back to pre-partition days. Largest democracy, significant role in peacekeeping operations, emerging economic power and responsible leadership are some of the forceful reasons put forth by India to stake this claim. Global realities and unwillingness of permanent members to proliferate this privilege, in spite of its acceptance largely by Western members, points to otherwise. In reality, they may finally agree to a permanent membership without Veto power. Is that acceptable? – is the question thrown up by this article.

The last piece, “A Call to Remember” by Mingma Lhamu Pakhrin and Bhanushali Gehlot brings out the need to make our countrymen aware of the sacrifices made by the Indian Armed Forces over time. While the people consider the Armed Forces as the instrument of last resort, they are quick to forget the sacrifices made by its gallant soldiers and their memories are relegated to the dungeons of history as there is no culture of “Remembrance” in our country. Generally, the people are aware of wars fought post-Independence; but the hardships undergone and the resultant intangible benefits to the State on account of participation of over three and half million Indian soldiers in two World Wars has largely gone unnoticed due to various reasons. This article makes a strong case for an urgent need of a National War Memorial to honour our fallen heroes who made the supreme sacrifice when the duty called.

Read on.....

# Comparing the Economies of China and India and its Impact on India's Strategic and Security Interests\*

Shri Sanjaya Baru®

## Introduction

One of the most influential research projects undertaken in the past quarter century was the study commissioned by the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on structural changes in the world economy. British economic historian Angus Maddison led the study and gathered statistical data that shows, among other things, changes in the structure of world income and trade over the past millennium. The most striking result of the study was that in 1700 China and India accounted for nearly half of world income, with the two Asian neighbours having roughly equal shares (around 23.0 per cent each) and that their shares declined sharply to close to around 5.0 each by the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Over two centuries of colonial rule and the fact that Asia missed out on the industrial and maritime revolutions were largely responsible for this. From 1950, both China and India have improved their shares of world income and even as recently as 1980 the two economies were more or less around the same level of development. It is now well known that in the post-Mao Dengist era, during the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese economy took off and rapidly marched ahead of India. There was a further acceleration of China's growth and its share of world trade after the year 2000.

Consequently, by 2016 the Chinese economy was over four times the size of the Indian economy (please refer **Table 1** below). India's nominal gross domestic product, in terms of US Dollars,

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\*This is an abridged version of the talk delivered by Shri Sanjaya Baru on "Comparing the Economies of China and India and its Impact on India's Strategic and Security Interests" at USI on 21 March 2017 with Lieutenant General PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), Director USI, in the Chair.

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
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was USD 2.5 trillion in 2016, while China's was USD 11.2 trillion. This gap is expected to persist over the short to medium term. China's recent economic slowdown (see graph of China real GDP growth below) and India's improved economic performance may help reduce the gap provided these extant trends persist.

However, in the foreseeable future, next five years, India has to live with the reality of this wide national income differential. Clearly, one consequence of the income gap would be a potential power gap, with China having the economic capacity to sustain larger defence budgets.

### China's real GDP growth

Annual % growth, quarterly



Source : CEIC Generate. 15 Apr 2016

**Table 1 : China – India – Size of the Economy & Per Capita Income, 2016-2020**

	India		China	
	2016	2020	2016	2020
<b>Nominal GDP</b> (Trillion USD)	2.5	3.6	11.2	16.2
<b>PPP GDP USD</b>	8.7	12.7	20.4	28.2
<b>Nominal GDP Per Capita USD</b>	1,942.0	2,672.0	8,659.0	11,449.0
<b>PPP GDP Per Capita USD</b>	6,746.0	9,328.0	14,813.0	20,004.0

### **China's Economic Slowdown**

China's economic growth rate has slowed since 2012. A report on the economy presented to the National People's Congress states that the 'target rate of growth' set by the country's economic policy makers for the period 2016-2020 is 6.5 per cent. This is way below the double digit levels that China recorded over the past quarter century. Several China-watchers, however believe that the 6.5 per cent target is perhaps an ambitious one because the real rate of growth recorded last year and this could be closer to 4.0 to 5.0 per cent. Whatever the numbers, the fact is that the Chinese economy is slowing down. One reason for this is the slowdown of the world economy. China has been increasingly dependent on the world economy for sustaining its income growth and so the global economic slowdown after 2008 has hurt China more than a country like India that has been less dependent on the global economy for its own economic growth.

In response to this slowdown macro-economic authorities in China have sought to rebalance the economy by shifting the earlier emphasis on investment-led growth to consumption-led growth. However, this has not been an easy switch to engineer. Chinese consumers continue to be frugal consumers, opting to save over 40 per cent of their income. The slow growth of domestic consumption along with the rapid decline in export demand and investment demand remains a major challenge for China.

One consequence of the slowdown in exports has been that China's current account surplus has reduced sharply from 10 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 2 per cent of GDP in 2014. Along with the sharp fall in the current account surplus there has been a rise in the fiscal deficit. The attempt to sustain growth through some investment even when demand has been constrained has contributed to a decline in the rate of return on investment and a sharp escalation of internal debt, which has risen from 150 per cent of GDP in 2010 to 250 per cent by 2016.

China's growth has been sustained by its emergence as a global trading power. Its total foreign trade in 2015 was estimated to be USD 4 trillion, compared to India's USD 0.5 trillion. China is the largest trading partner for 130 countries. More than its exporting power, what has contributed to rising Chinese geo-economic power is the fact that it has emerged as a major importing power, especially with respect to its Asian neighbours and Africa.

### China-India Bilateral Economic Relations

While China has emerged as one of India's major trading partners, the persistently high trade deficit that favours China (please refer **Table 2** below). This has become a major political issue. In 2015, total bilateral trade between India and China stood at USD 70 billion, but the trade deficit (favouring China) was as high as USD 53 billion. India's trade deficit with China was almost half of India's total trade deficit.

**Table 2 : China – India : 'Importing' Power**

	Total Trade / GDP 1960	Total Trade / GDP 2015	Imports / GDP 1960	Imports / GDP 2015
China	9.0	41.0	4.4	18.7
India	11.0	42.0	6.7	22.6

Given these trends and concerns, where are India-China trade relations headed, and how can the problem of the trade deficit be tackled? First, it is important to recognise that the mounting trade deficit has become political mainly on account of persisting concerns about lack of transparency in China's domestic policies and the larger problem of a trust deficit between the two countries. Absence of credible data enables critics to speculate about intentions, including charges that China is out to 'subvert' India's manufacturing sector. In fact, both China and India have levelled anti-dumping charges against each other. According to the Indian Ministry of Commerce, out of a total of 290 anti-dumping investigations initiated by the Directorate General of Anti-Dumping and Allied Duties between 1992, when the WTO system came into being, and 2013, as many as 159 cases involved imports from China. Hence, China must address the issue at a political and administrative level to gain India's trust. Establishing trust is the first major challenge.

Second, Indian exporters must do more to win brand recognition and the trust of Chinese consumers. India's overall image has to improve before ordinary consumer resistance can be overcome. China has been trying to overcome such consumer resistance around the world, including in India. If a select number of Indian brands emulate Lenovo's strategy in India, they may be able to overcome consumer resistance and widen the market for Indian goods in China.

Finally, China will have to graduate from exporting products to India to making India a part of its global supply chain and

manufacturing some of these products in India. This is the only way in which the problem of the trade deficit can be tackled.

### **China's Financial Power**

One consequence of the build-up of current account surpluses by China has been that it has begun to deploy these dollar reserves in pursuit of its geopolitical objectives. China's overseas development assistance (ODA) budget now exceeds that of the World Bank. The China Development Bank is now bigger than the World Bank in terms of its asset base and lending profile. China has created the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) in order to invest in overseas infrastructure and industrial development projects through tied aid that helps push Chinese investment and trade. China has acquired a stake in the European, African and Asian regional development banks, thereby, deploying its reserves to acquire voting power in almost all major development financing institutions globally.

Going beyond such unilateral initiatives, China has emerged as a major shareholder in the BRICS New Development Bank, headquartered in Shanghai, and has increased its vote share in the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Chinese RMB is now one of the reserve currencies of the IMF, along with the US Dollar, the Euro and the Japanese Yen. Taken together all of this has given China enormous clout in the global financial system, enhancing China's geo-economic power.

### **Geo-economics of China's Rise**

The fact is that even before China's emergence as a geopolitical power it has already become a major geo-economic power. It has been able to deploy its 'trading power' – especially its 'importing power' to reward and punish countries. Thus, after Mongolia hosted a visit by the Dalai Lama, China threatened punitive economic action, including blocking IMF aid to Mongolia, and secured an apology and an assurance from Mongolia that it would not host another visit by the Dalai Lama. China has threatened or taken such economic action against several countries establishing its geo-economic clout.

India has to take cognisance of the fact that China is today the largest trade partner, a source of increasing investment and even defence supplies to several of its South Asian neighbours. Notwithstanding the deceleration in economic growth, China has

funded a sustained increase in its defence budget, reminding us of Kautilya's aphorism in the *Artha Shastra*, "from the strength of the treasury, the army is born." China has emerged as a "strategic economic partner" with respect to many of India's neighbours, investing in port, power and other infrastructure projects that enable China to extend its power projection into the Indian Ocean region.

It is worth noting the fact that while the US's so-called 'pivot to Asia', in terms of deployment of troops in the Indo-Pacific, has not been matched by an economic commitment to the region (with President Donald Trump abandoning the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) project), China remains in play on the economic front bilaterally as well as multilaterally, with the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations. China has evolved from being a Trading Power to becoming an Investing Power and the launch of the One-Belt-One-Road (OBOR) project is a manifestation of this new phase in China's geo-economic power projection.

### **Conclusion**

China is presently dealing with a loss of competitiveness, rising debt burden, and excess capacity, all of which have combined to slow down its rate of growth. China has been hurt both by a decline in domestic investment, inadequate consumption demand and the global economic crisis. But, China has the capacity – both economic and political – to deal with the challenges posed by these factors. We must assume that China will come out of this and retain its geo-economic and geopolitical clout. If China's ruling class cannot manage the domestic political consequences of an economic slowdown, there could be changes in the way China manages itself. For example, the Communist Party of China (CPC) may yield political space to the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA). But, one must assume that between the two they would be able to manage the domestic political situation, the economic situation and their external implications.

From India's view point the major challenge in China-India relations will remain the current imbalance in the relative geo-economic power of the two countries. It will take more than a decade for India to be able to bridge the economic gap with China. This economic gap is fast converting into an overall national power potential gap. Dealing with this challenge will remain India's principal strategic challenge in the near term.

# The Situation in Jammu and Kashmir: The Way Forward\*

Lieutenant General DS Hooda, PVSM, UYSM,  
AVSM, VSM and Bar (Retd)®

## Introduction

Lieutenant General PK Singh, Director USI, Mr Anil Goswami, the Chair, ladies and gentlemen, I thank USI for providing me this opportunity and privilege to speak to such an informed audience. I will not talk about any final solution to the J&K problem. I think we are very far from that and therefore, there is no point theorising too much at this juncture. What I will talk about are the steps which could bring stability to the State. I will also describe the current situation, viewed from a historical perspective, as looking at incidents in isolation leads to quick-fix solutions at the expense of the holistic picture.

## Historical Perspective

I spent a long time in Northern Command; first as a Corps Commander and then as an Army Commander. These were difficult and challenging times. But as I look back, all these challenges fade in comparison to the initial brunt of insurgency that was faced by the officers and men when it all started. The insurgency broke out in J&K in early 1990; thousands of people came out on streets, BSF had to resort to firing and a large number of protestors were killed; thousands of people crossed over to Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) for training, and at that time there was a feeling among the locals in Kashmir Valley that freedom was just around the corner. 19 Jan 1990, the day Shri Jagmohan took over as the Governor of J&K, was the same night that thousands of Kashmiri Pandits fled the Valley.

However, by about 1993, when it appeared that the situation was improving, we saw direct intervention by Pakistan. The United

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\*This is an edited text of the talk delivered by Lieutenant General DS Hooda, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM and Bar (Retd), former GOC-in-C Northern Command, on the subject "The Situation in J&K : The Way Forward" on 11 Jan 2017 at USI, with Shri Anil Goswami, IAS (Retd) former Home Secretary of India in the Chair.

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Jihad Council was formed by Pakistan Army in 1994; Hizbul Mujahideen became more prominent as a pro-Pakistan group in comparison to Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which was pro-freedom.

1993 also saw violence spread to South of Pir Panjal. The first Hindu massacre in Kishtwar took place in 1993, and this trend of killing of Hindu population in the Jammu Region continued over the next decade. By 1995, insurgency had spread throughout the Jammu Region.

### **Intensification of Insurgency**

During the period between 1993 and 1996, on an average, one thousand civilians and a similar number of militants were killed each year. This was the scale of insurgency at that time. To fight this, additional formations of the Army were inducted into J&K. Raising of Rashtriya Rifles (RR) battalions started, and in mid-1990s two force headquarters were raised: Victor Force in the Valley and Delta Force for Doda Region. We found that with the induction of these additional forces, the situation had started stabilising; though violence was still high.

1999 saw the Kargil War. At that time the whole focus of the Northern Command shifted towards this theatre. Large number of regular formations that were involved in counter-insurgency in the hinterland were moved into the Ladakh and Kargil area. So, while we won the Kargil War, the insurgency and violence intensified during the years 2000 and 2001. According to South Asian Terrorism portal figures, there were a total of 4517 casualties in 2001 (1067 civilians, 600 security personnel, 2850 terrorists).

### **Decline in Insurgency**

After 2001, we saw a decline in violence. Additional RR Forces were raised: Kilo Force and Romeo Force; coordination with police and CRPF became better and so did the intelligence. There were also other factors that led to the improvement in security situation. One was the construction of Anti-Infiltration Obstacle System, commonly known as LC fence. The construction of the fence started in 2003 and this greatly contributed towards reduction in the number of infiltrators that were able to successfully sneak into J&K. Second and a lesser known fact is, that around this time

there was a section of local Muslim population - the Gujjars and Bakarwals, who turned against the militants in the areas of Poonch and Rajouri. This had a salutary effect. In my opinion, their contribution is unheralded, but I think it was extremely important. We saw evidence of this in Hill Kaka operations in 2003, where local support and guidance contributed to the success of the operations. There were a number of Muslims who returned from Saudi Arabia as they felt that their families were being harassed by foreign militants. We had the first all-women Village Defence Committee among the Muslims which was raised around the areas of Hill Kaka.

Hereon, we saw a very steady downward curve in militancy and violence. In 2007, total casualties including civilians, security forces and militants went below 1000 for the first time. 2008, 2009 and 2010 were the three years of massive protests but as far as militancy was concerned, the downward trend continued. 2012, can in some ways, be described as the best year as far as security forces were concerned. The total casualties including security forces, civilians and terrorists were 117, which in percentage terms was 2.5 per cent of the peak levels. The casualty figures in 2016 would be somewhere around 6 per cent of the peak levels. So, in my opinion when we look at data, we should look at it from a historical perspective and see how the security situation has improved.

### **Escalation by Pakistan**

In my assessment, it was in 2013, when militancy was at its lowest, that Pakistan decided to ratchet up the situation. It was also linked to the elections that took place in Pakistan in 2013. Prior to the elections, Mr. Nawaz Sharif had been issuing positive statements about relations with India, growing economic cooperation and how would things get better between the two countries. This did not suit the Pak military. Some of you may say this is mere speculation, but let us look at the facts as they unfolded in 2013. The year started with the mutilation of an Indian soldier, which led to tension on the borders. Elections took place in May in Pakistan and soon after the results in June, we saw an escalation in ceasefire violations along the LC. In June, eight Indian soldiers were killed in an attack at Hyderpora. In August, five soldiers were killed in an ambush on the LC. September 2013 saw the first attack from

across the IB sector since 2008, and thereafter there was a steady increase in the number of incidents of infiltrators attacking police or army camps along the National Highway (Hiranagar, Janglot, Dinanagar, Pathankot etc.). There was an activation of the Jammu Region and ceasefire violations which were 62 in 2011, had jumped to 347 in 2013 and to 583 in 2014.

### **Internal Situation in J&K**

September 2014 saw massive floods in Kashmir followed by a change of government in early 2015. Both these events had the potential for genuine outreach to the local population, but unfortunately a certain amount of mismanagement led to dissatisfaction among the locals. 2014-15 onwards, recruitment of militants from the local population was on the rise. Since more local recruitment was taking place, the casualties, particularly in South Kashmir, were largely of local youth who had joined militancy. They were poorly trained, poorly equipped and some were killed within just a few days of joining the militant outfits. This was breeding resentment among the local population, and during operations in South Kashmir, we would find locals turning out in protests, with women leading protests in a number of instances. It was also the time when tactics of the terrorists changed and there was a clear trend of targeting security forces, convoys and camps. In our assessment, groups were coming in from Pakistan tasked for this specific role.

2016 started with the attack in Pathankot, followed by Uri and Nagrota. There were surgical strikes into POK and the huge protests that broke out on 08 July after Burhan Wani was killed. Everyone in the audience is very familiar with these incidents so I am not going to dwell on these in detail.

### **The Way Forward**

Where do we go from here? In my opinion there are two centres of gravity: One is Pakistan's support to proxy war, and second is the population. I mention Pak support to proxy war because if we look at the insurgency as only an internal issue, we are going to go wrong in our assessment. It is mostly financed, armed and supported from across the border in Pakistan. It is a transnational insurgency. To say that it is purely internal is Pakistan's narrative. Therefore, we need to give a more serious thought to choking

Pakistan's support to this proxy war. A few things need to be done on priority are :-

(a) There has to be an effective sealing of borders; as they say 'the best offence is a good fence'. Some have argued that a fence would lead to a defensive mindset but in my opinion, we do not have an option. As I said earlier, most major incidents that have taken place in last two-three years have been by groups that have directly infiltrated from across the border. Work has already started along the IB and LC where we are putting up a new and smart fence.

(b) It needs no emphasis that we need to enhance the security of our bases and make them more difficult to target. I know we have received criticism on this and this criticism is justified to some extent. However, some of the solutions being suggested are only partial. It would be incorrect to say that these incidents are due to laxity and lethargy of soldiers, non-adherence to SOPs, lack of motivation among the soldiers etc. and that by addressing these, base security would become fine. There are limits to how much can you ask from a soldier. We have to put in place proper physical and electronic security measures. We need a comprehensive plan for protection of our bases and garrisons. For that, procedures need to be fast tracked, funds allocated and bureaucratic procedures cut through. It is important for us to do this otherwise the nation will look at the Army and say that if we can't protect our own garrisons how are we going to protect the country.

(c) We need to choke funding and finances that are coming in from Pakistan. I am afraid very little action has taken place in this regard. We know money is coming into terrorist groups by means of hawala and fake currency. Demonetisation may have had some impact, but this whole issue needs to be addressed at in greater detail.

(d) Diplomatic measures to pressurize Pakistan need to be stepped up. At every forum, Pakistan rakes up the issue and accuses India of human rights violation in J&K. We also need to do more.

(e) Lastly, as far as borders are concerned, we must have an unpredictable military response. I am afraid the CBMs along the LC are not working. We cannot have Pak Army

firing at us on the borders, attack us, ambush us and carry out mutilation of our soldiers. We need to get unpredictable as far as our response is concerned.

The second centre of gravity is the population. This is much more complex. We tend to look at things from a security perspective and sometimes miss out the problems that are troubling the people. As far as our overall military strategy is concerned, I think it has been very good and we don't need to tweak it too much. Even during the protests that took place, respect was shown to the Army by the locals. There was a massive outreach programme that was undertaken by the Army and it was successful only because the local population had a fair amount of faith in the military. However, there are some facts that we have to consider. These are :-

- (a) The local youth is upset. 70 per cent of the population in J&K today is below 31 years of age and the insurgency is now in its 27<sup>th</sup> year; so 70 per cent of the population has grown up in this environment and seen nothing but conflict. This conflict has affected every facet of their lives, be it social norms, education, livelihoods etc. We need to engage with the youth and address their fears and aspirations.
- (b) Hurriyat is exploiting the fear of an identity crisis in Kashmir. Most protests are provoked on the basis that the Kashmiri identity is under threat, and this is a fairly emotive issue with Kashmiris.
- (c) There is a need to create more jobs within J&K. Let us take, for instance, the UDAAN initiative by which the Government sponsors some industries to train and hire young people. We found that these youth would come back to J&K after a few months. I think there is potential within J&K to generate enough jobs in the fields of tourism, horticulture, handicrafts etc. There is definitely a need for the local youth to move out to other parts of the country, but at the same time it is important to create jobs and businesses within the State.
- (d) We need to seriously look at countering radicalisation and also deradicalising those who have already joined the militant outfits. We must also make significant efforts towards rehabilitation of returned terrorists.

(e) Development is another important aspect as it can bring about an improvement in lifestyles. However, there is a feeling that everything is going to the Valley and other areas are being neglected. We also need to look at Ladakh and Jammu. The locals of Jammu have a genuine concern - now when the militancy is at its lowest why isn't the development taking place? Take Reasi district for example, at one time it was a hotbed of militancy, today it is considered a militancy free district; but it still remains one of the most backward districts of J&K. These are genuine concerns.

(f) I think a more mature political handling of the situation is required. J&K has a major dependence on the Centre both economically and politically. Even during protests in 2016, people were looking at the Centre for resolution and not really at the State government.

(g) The government narrative has to be strengthened. There is a lot of negative campaigning being done by Pakistan. Post July 2016, we saw a huge social media campaign being orchestrated from Pakistan. We are slow to respond and don't have a well thought out strategy.

(h) I think we need to widen our outreach to include all sections of society. We only talk to State politicians, Hurriyat and government officials; we need to engage with more civil society groups, like students, academicians, traders etc.

(j) My last piece of advice is to Hurriyat – don't involve Pakistan in the resolution of internal issues. It complicates everything. There are talks that are taking place at the diplomatic level with Pakistan and let it be restricted to that. Pakistan is only muddying the waters by its interference. Only the Indian State can find resolution to problems of employment, development etc and not Pakistan.

I will close here by saying that there are no simple solutions and I think there are no early solutions also. We have to take a consistent and long term view and then follow it through. Sometimes individual events generate so much heat and distractions that we tend to lose sight of the bigger picture and start to look for quick fix solutions. That is counterproductive to developing long term strategy. My advice to all the current practitioners in J&K is that we need a very clear head and a very strong heart.

# Pakistan's Sea-based Nuclear Deterrence: Implications for India

Dr Roshan Khanijo®

## Introduction

Pakistan's desire to develop sea-based deterrence stems from its inherent insecurities and its ambition of competing with India. This race is further abetted and fuelled by its geostrategic alignment with China. Despite its aspirations, Pakistan knows its technological and financial limitations and hence, it has decided to invest in developing a Submarine Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM). Pakistan's escalatory policy of diversifying its tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) and extending them towards the sea is tremendously dangerous as it could cause a rupture in the delicate geostrategic balance. Furthermore, it is also bound to create added instability in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This threat perception is intensified by China's willingness to aid and abet Pakistan's mission in order to cause complications that might dampen India's power projection. They plan to do so by developing Pakistan's nuclear trajectories and creating base facilities for their ships and submarines in Pakistani bases, thus spreading a pervasive Chinese influence through the IOR.

To provide a little context, Pakistan's nuclear trajectory began in the 1970s, and since then it has endeavoured to expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal. According to the report by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (November 2016), Pakistan has a nuclear weapons stockpile of 130-140 warheads and have plans to increase its arsenal further.<sup>1</sup> This number may grow to about 220-250 by 2025, making it the fifth largest nuclear weapons state globally. This paper tries to analyse Pakistan's nuclear policies – particularly its sea based nuclear deterrence – in a changing global environment, and its implications for India.

## Pakistan's Nuclear Strategy

Nuclear weapons have been an intrinsic part of the Pakistani military strategy since the time Pakistan declared itself a nuclear weapon State. These weapons form the fundamental core of their

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strategy and the primary principle behind this shift has been Pakistan's assumption that any threat or inequality can be countered through nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup> Pakistan's threat perception is India centric and its military strategies have thus revolved around, (a) the acquirement of advanced technologies to seek a competitive edge; (b) alignment with major powers mainly the US and China and (c) the continuation and commentary of its asymmetric warfare and nuclear blackmail.<sup>3</sup> Historically, Pakistan knew that technologically and economically it lags behind India, and therefore, it adopted the policy of aligning with major powers like the US initially, and then China in order to get economic aid and military weapons. Pakistan considers an 'aggressive, bigger and conventionally superior India', a challenge, hence terrorism and 'proxy war' are tools that have been adopted to "bleed India through a thousand cuts". They believe that their propagandistic threat of the usage of nuclear weapons has lowered the nuclear threshold and prevented India from taking any punitive action. The Pakistani nuclear strategy of "First Use" is specifically India centric. Lieutenant General Lodhi has stated in the Pakistan Defence Journal, *"In a deteriorating military situation when an Indian conventional attack is likely to break through our defence or has already breached the main defence line causing a major setback to the defences which cannot be restored by conventional means at our disposal, the government would be left with no option except to use nuclear weapons to stabilise the situation. India's superiority in conventional arms and manpower would have to be offset by nuclear weapons.....Pakistan's nuclear doctrine would, therefore, essentially revolve around the first strike option. In other words, we will use nuclear weapons if attacked by India even if the attack is with conventional weapons."*<sup>4</sup>

### **Pakistan's Nuclear Policy Changes**

Over the years Pakistan has become more confident about its nuclear policy and the handling of its nuclear arsenals. They have brought to the fore the defensive concept of 'Minimum Credible Deterrence' with the objective of depicting Pakistan as a responsible nuclear weapon state. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has also stated that 'nuclear restraint, stabilisation and minimum credible deterrence constitute the basic elements of Pakistan's Nuclear Policy'.<sup>5</sup> Since then, Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, the erstwhile head of the Strategic Planning Division, commented in Pakistan,

*“nuclear weapons would be used only if the very existence of Pakistan as a state is at stake”.*<sup>6</sup> As evinced by this statement, a few red lines or thresholds under which nuclear weapons can be used have been declared for the first time. Nevertheless within the subcontinent, at least Pakistan maintains that with respect to India, its propagandistic “First Use” policy remains very much in force. In order to be able to implement such a threat they have been working on the improvement and diversification of their nuclear force structures. Pakistani interlocutors have also begun highlighting the need to develop more aspects of their nuclear strategy such as ‘full spectrum deterrence’ or building deterrence ‘at all levels of the threat spectrum’/‘flexible deterrence options.’<sup>7</sup> It is in this policy of ‘full spectrum response’ that the Pakistanis have thought of developing TNWs, both for the land and sea, leading to an increase in the number of nuclear weapons that they own. The futility of their current ‘first strike’ model has made them recalibrate their position and deliberate the possibility of developing their triad. This investment is most evident particularly in the third leg of the triad which is ‘Sea-based Deterrence’.

### **Pakistan’s Sea-based Deterrence**

Three vectors have been responsible for making them consider the possibility of sea-based deterrence. Firstly, India’s second strike capabilities, which could potentially be used as a retaliatory attack, thus negate their “First Use”. Furthermore, India’s long range ballistic missiles and its ability to target the entire Pakistani landmass adds to this threat of a believable retaliatory second strike and serves to increase their agitation. The second factor is India’s acquirement of the Nuclear Powered Submarine (SSN) from Russia and our subsequent efforts at the development of indigenous nuclear submarines. Finally, the third vector motivating them towards sea-based deterrence is China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation, and the Chinese endeavour to build on Pakistani naval capabilities, in order to counter the predominant Indian influence in the IOR.

Pakistan’s proclivity to align with major powers globally has reaped good benefits. In the initial years they were able to systematically receive requisite armaments from the US, and the US refused to take cognisance of Pakistan nuclear programme and the proliferation issues. After the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962,

Pakistan turned towards China with the aim of furthering its nuclear programme. The Pakistani nuclear programme was fundamentally possible solely because of Chinese help. All the aspects of their current arsenal, ranging from delivery vehicles to reactors have Chinese imprints on them, and the same is now being done with their naval nuclear assets. As has been historically proven, Pakistan is primarily fixated on finding the means required to circumvent Indian superiority. This is evinced by their military strategisation, wherein they endeavour to counter conventional Indian superiority with nuclear weapons. Similarly, they use the implementation of TNWs as a retaliatory mechanism against the Indian Cold Start doctrine. This last attempt at developing their nuclear triad is also a directly reflective response aimed at countering and opposing Indian sea-based deterrence through the development of a modified version of a nuclear-capable *Babur-3* SLCM. What needs to be noted in particular is the fact that the land version of the *Babur* cruise has been reverse engineered from the American *Tomahawk* by the Chinese. Therefore, the Chinese intent driving the development of Pakistan's nuclear trajectory is self-evident and self-explanatory and will continue in future too.

Pakistan had established the Naval Strategic Force Command in 2012 in order to focus on developing sea-based deterrence capabilities. Furthermore, in order to make the deterrence credible, and to have a sufficient number of submarines, Pakistan once again turned to its trusted old friend and supplier China, who will now provide the Pakistan Navy with eight modified diesel-electric attack submarines by 2028. According to *IHS Jane's Fighting Ships*, the Type 041 *Yuan*-class is "a diesel electric attack submarine (SSK), potentially with Stirling air-independent propulsion, that is armed with YJ-2 (YJ-82) anti-ship missiles and a combination of Yu-4 (SAET-50) passive homing and Yu-3 (SET-65E) active/passive homing torpedoes, and is supposed to be the quietest submarine in the People's Liberation Army (Navy) inventory."<sup>8</sup> Additionally, in 2016, Pakistan also unveiled a very low frequency (VLF) communication facility (aimed at enabling it to communicate with deployed submarines) and according to an official news release by the military's Inter Services Public Relations media branch, the VLF facility is at a new base, PNS *Hameed*, near Pakistan's main port of Karachi, and is the first of its kind in the country.<sup>9</sup> Recently,

Pakistan had also announced that it has successfully carried out the first-ever test of its nuclear-capable *Babur-3* SLCM from a submerged platform. *Babur-3* has a range of 450 km and is capable of nuclear payload delivery. Once this is finally developed and operationalised the advantage they believe they may have is that “*Babur-3* will enhance the survivability of its second strike forces. Therefore, Pakistan is working towards the development of a doctrine through which they can afford to have a less forward-leaning posture with its land-based tactical nuclear forces. This is primarily because Pakistani military planners will have less reason to fear the “use it or lose it” dilemma at the start of a conflict with India – and should contribute to strategic stability and may not require its planning to necessarily prepare for the early use of lower-order nuclear options.”<sup>10</sup>

Simultaneously, one needs to keep an eye on Pakistan’s infrastructural development as well. One such major development which is often overlooked is the Jinnah Naval Base at Ormara, in Baluchistan, situated 350 km west of Karachi and 285 km east of the Gwadar Port. This is an important tactical base which has become fully operationalised. Aside from being an essential geographical asset, this naval base has also enhanced the Pakistan Navy’s strategic reach in the West Coast right up to the Strait of Hormuz. The fact that it will also have a submarine base and is connected to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) implies that this would be especially beneficial for the Chinese, as they can use this base in the future for dual purposes, both for logistics and for enhancing their strategic reach.<sup>11</sup> This base also has the facility to repair ships and submarines. The fact that Chinese submarines and support vessels have been berthed in these ports goes to prove that the focus on support infrastructure for strategic platforms is also being developed which will further aid Pakistan strategically in due course, as they will have the infrastructure ready for its strategic naval assets. Furthermore, in the future, this base might be developed as an alternative or rather an extension of the Karachi Port. Thus Pakistan, like countries across the world, is trying to mould its geostrategic power nexus to its advantage by diversifying its assets and thereby intensifying its deterrent capabilities. The speed with which Pakistan is developing its naval infrastructure is a testimony to the fact that the naval wing which had been hitherto neglected in the past has taken precedence over the two other Services for now.<sup>12</sup>

### **Implications for India**

The Indian Navy has played a significant role in previous conflicts against Pakistan. It continues to maintain its superiority in terms of operations and strategic assets. The naval modernisation and indigenous building of ships, submarines and other paraphernalia required to maintain a credible deterrence continues. India joining the Missile Technological Control Regime (MTCR) has further eased the procurement of technologies. However, several theorists believe that Pakistan's development of its sea-based tactical nuclear assets is going to impact the situation in the IOR. The question that arises therefore is; whether Pakistan's SLCM in future can hamper Indian naval submarine capabilities, the way Pakistani's deployment of TNWs on land constrained the Indian Army's retaliatory capabilities. Some theorists believe that nuclear tipped tactical cruise missiles can damage both, the adversary's counter force as well as counter value targets more lethally than conventional torpedoes. Further, the conundrum that emerges is whether a kill chain should be engaged given that the enemy could potentially be carrying dual missile technologies. Theorists believe that decision making problems in conflict situations might emerge as Indian Navy might be unable to come to a decision regarding whether or not they should attack Pakistani conventional submarines that might potentially have the requisite capabilities to carry dual missiles. Nevertheless, other military strategists have suggested that during a state of war, a submarine will engage in a kill strike irrespective of the adversary's dual missile potential. The last year Uri strikes have to a large extent nullified Pakistan's propaganda of TNWs. Similarly, its sea-based assets could be more for the purpose of survivability than for attack purposes. Still, given the geostrategic volatility it is essential that India modernise its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities and other sea-based nuclear assets so that it can continue to maintain its credible deterrence.

In conclusion, it could be said that just as TNWs on land had created dilemmas for Pakistan, similarly SLCM trajectory is also going to create more problems for them. There will be command and control problems, since nuclear capable cruise missiles have to be launch-ready prior to departure from port. There is also a lot of concern regarding whether or not Pakistan will be able to put fail-safe safety protocols and personnel reliability programmes in place.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, Pakistan is also a hub/breeding ground for terrorist groups and aside from the dangers of the loss of command

and control there is also an increased risk of theft, sabotage, accidental launches and escalatory conflicts. There is a need for Pakistan therefore, to re-examine the complexities of its nuclear doctrine and whether these assets are going to create more vulnerabilities; and if so, are the risks worth the payoffs that might accompany the deterrence benefits of a questionably survivable platform in a shooting war.<sup>14</sup>

While it is true that India is geographically, economically and militarily stronger than Pakistan, it still needs to keep track of the latter's movements in order to effectively counter aggressive strategic posturing. It needs to develop its ASW capabilities in order to protect its assets and prevent its adversaries from striking strategic counter value targets.

### **Conclusion**

Pakistan is slowly but surely envisioning a greater role for its Navy not only in terms of the IOR but also in terms of securing its sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) along the West Coast. It is using its strategic location for the twin purpose of countering Indian forces while also enhancing its reach to the extremities of West Asia. Given these geostrategic advantages, Pakistan is leaving no stone unturned in its mission to develop its naval assets in terms of warheads as well as infrastructure. Furthermore, China on its part is ready to support Pakistan in all its technological domains purportedly for the benefits they might accrue from that relationship. China is aware that given the geostrategic pivot against India, Pakistan will oblige in any way possible and provide logistical support to Chinese ships and submarines. Gwadar has already been leased to Chinese companies and the extremely important port of Ormara is being connected to the CPEC. A two front war on land has always been a prevalent threat hanging over the Indian subcontinent. But there is reason to believe that this collusive threat may manifest itself through the sea in the coming decades. Given Pakistan's development of its naval arsenal and China's naval modernisation schemes – particularly its efforts in building more aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines – the shifting dynamics of geostrategic interaction need to be watched with interest. The three major problems that might stunt India's ability to counter such an attack are complacency and overconfidence, infrastructural and procurement delays and bureaucratic obfuscation. Delaying defence projects and a systematic stalling of defense infrastructural engagement are dangerous tendencies

that need to be avoided if India's current superiority is to be maintained. The current power balance in the region is tilted towards India, but to maintain this, India needs to take proactive actions. Constant vigilance against enemy manoeuvres and adopting appropriate modernisation trends is, therefore, the clarion call of the hour.

### Endnotes

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<sup>2</sup> Roshan Khanijo, *Complexities and Challenges of Nuclear India*, Vij Publications, New Delhi, 2015.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

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<sup>5</sup> "Remarks of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif on Nuclear Policies and the CTBT", National Defence College, Islamabad, 20 May 1999.

<sup>6</sup> Dr Shalini Chawala, *Nuclear Pakistan*, KW, Publishers, New Delhi.

<sup>7</sup> Inter Services Public Relations, "Press Release," No. PR130/2012-ISPR, 29 May 2012. Available at [http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=press\\_release&id=2074](http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=press_release&id=2074). Accessed on 26 Dec 2016. Also see Adil Sultan, "Pakistan's emerging nuclear posture," p. 163.

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<sup>10</sup> Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang, *Pakistan Tests New Sub-Launched Nuclear-Capable Cruise Missile: What Now?* The Diplomat, January 10, 2017. Available at <http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/pakistans-tests-new-sub-launched-nuclear-capable-cruise-missile-what-now/>. Accessed on 10 Jan 2017.

<sup>11</sup> Roshan Khanijo, *Strategic Significance of Pakistan's Ormara Naval Base*, United Service Institution of India, <http://usiofindia.org/Article/?pub=Strategic%20Perspective&pubno=49&ano=2872>.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Brig Kuldeep Singh (Retd), *Pakistan test of Submarine launched Cruise Missile*, CLAWS Issue Brief, No 57 January 2017.

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# UNPKO and Military Contributions: Challenges and Opportunities for Asia-Pacific Governments

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## Introduction

A number of studies have already taken place to address the challenges that plague the peacekeeping missions. Yet, nothing much has changed. To this end, one of the four essential shifts called for by the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report is “*The United Nations Secretariat must become more field-focused and United Nations peace operations must be more people-centered.*”<sup>1</sup> This is because there is a big gap between what is preached conceptually and how it is interpreted in field. To begin with, the way the basic principles of peacekeeping are interpreted and implemented is the biggest challenge impacting all peacekeeping missions and most importantly those nations who contribute the most. The often talked of inability of the peacekeepers to implement the mandate, more specifically when it comes to saving human lives, is more because of the lack of clarity in understanding the principles of peacekeeping and the mandate, and less due to lack of will and inadequacy in their capability.

## Principles of Peacekeeping

Adherence to these principles provides legitimacy to UN peacekeeping. Importance of the *principle of consent* at strategic, operational and tactical level is well understood. However, such a situation will be rare and more often than not, consent will be out of compulsion either due to threat or incentive. And when either of these is diluted, consent is recanted. The famous Bamboo Pole incident of 30 May 1992 in Cambodia is an example of withdrawal of consent at tactical level. When Khmer Rouge prevented the motorcade of the SRSG Yashushi Akashi and the Force

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Commander General Sanderson by erecting a bamboo pole from entering their area of influence, both leaders were in a dilemma. Even though it was a fit case to use force to ensure freedom of movement, the senior leaders decided against it as use of force would have antagonised the rebels resulting possible bloodshed and sabotage of the diplomatic efforts to get the party to come around. In this case, Khmer Rouge earlier consented to the peace process but later withdrew.<sup>2</sup>

Somalia can be cited as an example of how the mission leader managed to persuade the rebel leader to give his consent, which was initially denied. In April 1992, at the behest of Mohamed Sahnoun, the Head of the Mission, Mohammed Aideed, a major rebel leader, agreed to deployment of 500 UN peacekeepers in Somalia for protection of humanitarian aid convoys. But later, dismissal of Sahnoun and UN's decision to deploy 3000 peacekeepers without consulting either Sahnoun or Aideed seems to be the turning point of UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia. In Somalia there was no legitimate leader to give consent and Mohd Aideed (leader of the belligerent group) never consented to UN multinational operation. It is only after the Algerian senior diplomat Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun was appointed as the leader of UN mission in April 1992 and he could forge a special relationship with Aideed, things started to look brighter. It was Mohamed Sahnoun who could turn a situation of disadvantage to advantage of the UN.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, such an opportunity was lost by his exit. What followed thereafter in Somalia and its consequent effect on the subsequent missions elsewhere (e.g. in Rwanda) is a sad commentary in UN peacekeeping's history.

Many see the *principle of impartiality* as an active element for impartial implementation of the mandate even by use of force. However, to some, it is synonymous with neutrality, and not taking action against perpetrators of violence because of lack of understanding of the mandate is considered being impartial. There is no better example than what happened when Hutu militias came down on the Tutsis in Rwanda on 6<sup>th</sup> April 1994 and killed Prime Minister Agathe Uwlingiyimana as well as ten peacekeepers from Belgium.<sup>4</sup> Even though the mission took actions to protect the civilians in defiance of the orders from UNHQ at New York, France, Italy, Belgium and the USA instructed their contingents only to evacuate their own nationals.<sup>5</sup> These nations probably wanted to

remain neutral by not taking action against the perpetrators of violence. At the same time, there is also example of adhering to the principle of impartiality in the same mission. When confronted by Hutu militias who were earlier trained by French military, Brigadier General Jeau Claude Lafourcade did not hesitate to demonstrate his resolve impartially and removed Hutu's roadblock by force.<sup>6</sup> Confusion over differences between impartial versus neutral roles of peacekeepers could lead to disastrous results. Massacre of thousands of innocent civilians in Srebrenica in 1995 and the very little assistance that came from the UN is another pointer to this.<sup>7</sup>

*Use of force* – the third principle, which is intractably connected to other two principles perhaps, is the most controversial of the three when it comes to its interpretation. There is either intentional or perceived misunderstanding that force can be used only under Chapter VII, whereas even a peacekeeping operation under Chapter VI can use force in self-defence. Even though guidelines for use of force come in the form of Rules of Engagement (RoE), there is confusion in their interpretation. Therefore, the truth that every time force is used is retaliated resulting in fatality probably is the primary factor dwelled upon by the commander whether to use force or not. For instance, use of UN Peacekeepers as human shield against NATO air strikes in former Yugoslavia in April 1994 and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels taking UN peacekeepers as hostage in Sierra Leone in 2000 are a few such examples.

### **Mandate**

Different interpretation of principles of peacekeeping are inter-related and directly linked to the mandate itself. Very often a vague mandate has been quoted as the root cause of the problem. Then the question arises why the mandate cannot be absolutely clear. It is because mandates continue to be a product of political manipulation after what transpires in the back room discussions amongst a few powerful members of the UN. However, unlike pre-2000, mandates of most of the contemporary peacekeeping missions have become more clear and stronger, with detailed and multifarious tasking to the peacekeepers. What however not clear is 'how' to implement the mandate. While broad objectives of the mandate are laid down, the essential part of the 'how' remains to be defined.<sup>8</sup> One of the reasons is that UN HQs don't want to

micro manage day to day activities of the peacekeeping missions which are better left to the leaders in the field. Another reason for lack of clarity on the method of implementation is because it provides flexibility to the main parties to the conflict to consent to the peace agreement. For instance, in context of Somalia, presence of the mission and implementation of the mandated task for protecting the personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies as well as of NGOs providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance was a clear threat and obstruction to the power struggle to main rivals – Ali Mahdi and Mohammed Aideed. But the political leaders desperately needed the UN to get economic aid even though remaining suspicious of UN's probable hidden agenda. Later in a disastrous episode, when the UN troops tried to disarm Aideed's forces, it responded by killing twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers and eighteen American Rangers after one of their helicopters was shot down by Aideed's forces in 1993.<sup>9</sup> On the other hand, absence of a framework (outlining the mode for implementation) and uncertainty always gives enough latitude to the main parties to the conflict to derail the peace process. Mandate of United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is a case in point where some of the mandated tasks such as "to take all necessary actions in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind" imply taking action against any armed activity by either Hezbollah or other group. But how to implement this was not defined.<sup>10</sup> This was and still is a predicament for UNIFIL. For, firstly without Hezbollah's unwritten consent, SCR 1701 could not have been adopted and hence any action against this outfit won't be acceptable to them. And, any retaliation consequent to use of force by UNIFIL to implement the mandate will not be acceptable to even to the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). Secondly, UNIFIL's operational activity like patrolling in its area of operation is seen as intruding into the privacy of the locals (mostly Shiites population which is in majority in South Lebanon). Resultant effect is that the mission's sincere approach to implement the mandated task is always viewed negatively by the population.

As long as there is ambiguity, principles of peacekeeping will continue to be the victims of the UN bureaucracy. Innocent civilians suffer the most when peacekeeping missions are unable to protect them because there is no clarity on how to provide such protection.

For example; Is it to be done simply by providing a perimeter defence waiting for the perpetrators of the violence to come closer to the camp or moving out of the camp to deter them at a distance either by patrolling or for that matter whether laying ambushes would be a better option? Further, how does one provide protection when one of the parties responsible for the violence is state sponsored? What happened in the civilian camp in Malaka in South Sudan in February 2016 amplifies such a predicament. The civilian camp, co-located with the UN base, housed more than 37,000 people mainly from Dinkar and Nuer communities. When the fighting broke out between these two groups, a large number of civilians rushed towards to the UN base for shelter. Fearing a situation which could go out of control and possible entry of armed rogue elements along with the fleeing crowd, orders were not to open the gate of the UN base, which is only one third size of the civilian camp. Indian peacekeepers defied the orders and opened the gate but managed to save hundreds of lives.<sup>11</sup> They also had to resort to use of force by opening fire. Action of the Indian peacekeepers in Malaka was guided by their belief in ethics and not on legality of the matter, because they are trained that way and there is no caveat from Indian government. Since defiance of orders resulted in a positive outcome, no question was asked. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the peacekeepers who were manning the main gate came under criticism from a few scholars who did not appreciate what was achieved or enquire how illegal arms were smuggled inside the camp in the first place.

These challenges add up to a skewed perception of the peacekeeping missions. It happens because there is no framework, which can be generally accepted for evaluation of the peacekeeping missions. And this provides oxygen to a few commentators not even remotely connected to the reality in field but keen to pass judgement on performance of peacekeeping operations based only on second hand information.

### **Terrorist Violence**

There are many other challenges that impact day to day operations of the field missions. The most complex one is the threat of extreme violence. Inter-State conflicts are mostly bygone and so also the traditional or first generation peacekeeping missions. Out of eleven nations which are most affected by terrorism, seven nations host

peacekeeping missions. When extreme violence is part of the threat landscape, *firstly* it will be difficult to find willing nations to participate because of the likelihood of increased fatality and *secondly*, lack of sustenance by cash strapped United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) will result in mission creep. In Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 33 percent peacekeepers are still housed under tents and the mission lacks 50 percent ablution units. *Thirdly*, such threat compels the peacekeepers to emphasise more on force protection resulting in *bunkerisation*, use of force even when not required and as a result distancing from the same population who is meant to be saved. In such a situation, interpretation of principles gets more complicated. Even the contribution of other substantive elements of the UN – the civilian staff members, who are generally responsible for some important peace building tasks, fall short. In addition, there are some other common challenges :-

- (a) There is improvement in standard of training and personal equipment but most of the contingents lack organisational and logistical capability except for a few developed nations.
- (b) While there is will to participate in complex and difficult missions by nations from Asia and Asia Pacific regions, advanced nations that have the capability rarely participate in such missions.
- (c) In peacekeeping missions with balanced multinational participation, there is a lack of interoperability and disparity in mission profile.
- (d) Rapid deployment capability is limited only to a few nations, who are very selective in picking up missions which can provide maximum political leverage.
- (e) Poor road communication network in a few conflict zones is a hindrance to effective response by the peacekeepers.
- (f) In most difficult missions, ratio of the peacekeepers to task is very poor. For example, in DRC less than 4000 Indian peacekeepers have to cover an area of approximately 80,000 sq km.
- (g) Incentive for participation in complex missions is badly lacking—representation at senior level leaders is negligible

and rates of reimbursement have not been adequately revised for a long time. Present rates of reimbursement are rather low.

(h) Many smaller nations who are willing to participate find it difficult to meet the UN standard of Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) and Self – Sustainment.

(j) Lack of coordination amongst the major participating nations results in monopoly of non-participating nations on important policy decisions of the UN.

### **Opportunities**

While there are challenges, there are also opportunities for the nations who are willing to participate and are participating in difficult missions. In order to enhance their contribution, first and foremost will be the need for a congruence of thought in developing individual national and collective capability for peacekeeping by communicating, consulting, cooperating, coordinating, supporting, sharing and synergising (C4S3) individual national capacities and important UN policy matters. Some areas for such cooperation are :-

- (a) Increase in participation by military and police contingents in individual national capacity under UN mandate.
- (b) Increased participation by women peacekeepers. It will make the missions more population centred.
- (c) Participation under partnership program for those countries who find it difficult to field bigger contingents with either full or part COEs and unable to meet the UN standard of self-sustainment.
- (d) Increased contribution by force enablers like medical units, engineering construction units, aviation assets (both armed and logistic assets) and de-mining units.
- (e) Develop a regional framework for intelligence sharing and assessment of the security dynamics.
- (f) Building consensus for mandate formulation, review of UN reimbursement for COE and, contingent and staff officers' allowances.

- (g) Undertake study to review important UN documents. Analysis of the HIPPO report was a good opportunity.
- (h) Encourage research and publication on UN-related subjects and sharing these in public domain.
- (i) Consider taking up specific study such as *“Formulation of assessment criteria for evaluation of peacekeeping operation”* as a subset of a main study. Such study would help to analyse the reasons for success or failure of peacekeeping mission and enhance regional capability.
- (j) Joint training of staff and peacekeeping contingents to improve interoperability.
- (k) Develop civilian peacekeeping capability within the region for peacebuilding tasks including NGOs.

## Conclusion

Asia-Pacific region stands to benefit when we are able to pool their hard and soft skills. However, they need to iron out their differences in their national opinions with respect to issues like principles of peacekeeping and these should be in sync with collective capacity building. Otherwise, peacekeeping missions will continue to be plagued by criticism for their shortcomings. Because, when it comes to delivery, correct understanding and interpretation of principles of peacekeeping and nuances of mandate formulation will matter more than the force structure itself. Reason for varying interpretation is more because of national policy and less for misinterpretation by the leaders in field. In this regard, a deeper understanding of wide ranging security related subjects amongst nations would be necessary. This can begin with non-peacekeeping subjects and thereafter graduating to specific peacekeeping policies. By nature, people from Asia-Pacific Region are known to have empathy and ability to discern the grey between the black and white. This gives them the capacity to field competent candidates to lead difficult and complex missions. Currently, there is a crisis because of uneven distribution of mission leadership, with a focus on a peace agreement and ceasefire, and not beyond.

There is no doubt that challenges will continue to face the UN and the region’s collective endeavour in peacekeeping. One should be optimistic of substantive and positive contribution in making the

Asia-Pacific's presence in UN Peacekeeping more visible and valued. It will help to bridge the existing gap between the policy makers and the practitioners, and in making UN peacekeeping operations more effective than what is today.

### Endnotes

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# North Korea's Nuclear Programme and Its Impacts on Regional Security

Major General Hoang Ky Lan, PhD®

## Introduction

On 1st January 2017, in a televised New Year's Day speech, North Korea's President Kim Jong Un stressed that his country was emerging as a nuclear power, thanks to the two successful nuclear tests, a series of ballistic missile launches in 2016, as well as the entering of the last stage of intercontinental ballistic missile manufacture.<sup>1</sup> His speech immediately attracted attention from international community. US Department of State spokeswoman Anna Richey-Allen said, "Kim's speech was a provocative action and a threat to international peace and stability".<sup>2</sup> The newest missile test of the medium long-range ballistic missile *Pukguksong-2* was launched on 12 Feb 2017. This was the follow-on action of the fifth nuclear test on 09 Sep 2016, in Punggye-ri area, causing an "artificial earthquake" of 5.3 Richter, equivalent to a yield of 20 to 30 kilotons, or similar to the two nuclear bombs that the US dropped on Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

## North Korea's Nuclear Weapon Program

North Korea started its initial research on development of plutonium nuclear weapon in the 1960s. According to military experts, up to this moment, North Korea possessed about 20 nuclear warheads and 10 to 16 nuclear units.<sup>3</sup> In the 1980s, North Korea turned to the second stage of uranium nuclear weapons. According to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in 1997 Pakistan started the transfer of technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, nuclear explosive simulation, and undertook camouflage measures to hide nuclear development facilities from satellites for North Korea.<sup>4</sup> In 2010, North Korea revealed its uranium enrichment programme by inviting an American expert to visit one of its facilities which contained 2,000 centrifuges. However, according to analysts, North Korea owns a nuclear enrichment facility with 10,000 centrifuges.<sup>5</sup>

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Since 2006, North Korea has conducted five underground nuclear tests at the testing area at Punggye-ri. The first test was on 10 Oct 2006; the second on 25 May 2009; the third on 12 Feb 2013; the fourth on 06 Jan 2016 and the fifth on 09 Sep 2016. The yield of the first test was about one kiloton, the second about 2-7 kilotons, the third about 15 kilotons, and the fourth about 20 kilotons. According to military experts, in the 2013 test, North Korea used uranium. It was a breakthrough in nuclear technology of Pyongyang. This information was then confirmed by then South Korea's Minister of Defence Kim Kwan-jin, in November 2013.<sup>6</sup>

In addition, on 24 Aug 2016, North Korea tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The test was successful. The missile flew 500 km before it dropped in Japan's Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ).<sup>7</sup>

Up to now, the United Nations Security Council has adopted six resolutions to sanction North Korea regarding its nuclear and missile programmes, i.e. Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016); the newest being the Resolution 2321 on 30 Nov 2016, prohibiting North Korea from exporting coal, one of the biggest foreign currency resources of the country, aiming at decreasing 60 per cent of its annual coal export volume.<sup>8</sup>

Since the 1970s, North Korea started the research and development of missile technology by applying reverse manufacturing technology of the Soviet Union Scud-B missile, which it acquired from Egypt. From the design of Scud-B missile, North Korea has produced modifications with extended range, namely No Dong and Taepo Dong Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). Then, North Korea sold No Dong to Iran and Pakistan. Based on the North Korean design of No Dong, the two countries produced Shehab and Ghauri, respectively. In 1992, North Korea signed a USD 500 million contract with Iran for cooperation to produce nuclear weapon and No Dong missiles.<sup>9</sup>

At the moment, North Korea has a large amount of functional ballistic missiles. It has deployed a total of 800 Scud short range, tactical ballistic missiles, 300 No Dong medium range and 50 Musudan intermediate range missiles. While the Scud can attack targets in South Korea, the Musudan can attack targets in Japanese Okinawa Islands and Guam Islands of the US.<sup>10</sup>

According to military experts, North Korea has full nuclear attack capability. In June 2016, North Korea's President Kim Jong Un said that his country's missile force was capable of attacking the US military bases in South Korea, Japan and Guam, as well as in the US mainland.<sup>11</sup> North Korea also announced that it had tested smaller and lighter nuclear warheads which could be carried on its missiles. According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) Television, Korean Nuclear Research Center has officially confirmed that the nuclear explosion on 09 Sep 2016 was to test the yield of miniaturised nuclear warhead being mounted on long-range missile that could reach the US mainland.<sup>12</sup> North Korea even threatened to use hydrogen bomb to turn Seoul into a massive inferno after the confirmation of the South Korean Ministry of Defence's plan to assassinate Kim Jong Un.

### **Why does North Korea Need Nuclear Weapons?**

First, North Korea needs an effective weapon to cope with foreign invasion. North Korean leader believes that nuclear weapon is the most effective weapon of deterrence. Possessing nuclear weapons means holding the political, psychological and diplomatic power against the enemy. With nuclear weapons, no other country would take risks launching an preemptive attack on North Korea. It explains why in the last several decades, North Korea has focused all its potential on the nuclear weapon programme, despite its economic difficulties. Through its nuclear weapon program, North Korea expects to improve its national defence potential and gradually become a military power in the region.

Second, North Korea wants to reaffirm its position as a "nuclear weapon country". Despite economic difficulties due to the sanctions and protest from the international community, North Korea has shown no intention of giving up its nuclear program. Its target is to become a "nuclear weapon state" and improve its negotiating power with the US (from negotiation on denuclearisation of Korea peninsula to negotiation on a peace agreement). Though, North Korea acknowledges that the US would never recognise it as a "nuclear weapon state"; only two days after the fifth nuclear tests (09 Sep 2016), North Korea still urged the US to do so and officially announced that "it would continue to develop its nuclear force" to cope with the US.

Third, North Korea needs nuclear weapon to assist in the solving of internal issues. The success of nuclear weapon programme is the biggest victory that is easily observed. It is also the “answer” for economic difficulties, the “encouragement” for millions of people to overcome their economic difficulties, the excitement of national pride and the consolidation of power for the government. Particularly, after the transition of power to a new generation, North Korea is still embeded with the political crisis. President Kim Jong Un got power at a very young age, when his country was prepared to open door and there were interferences from outside. In its international relations and relations with neighbouring contries, North Korea has been isolated and under coercion.

Fourth, use nuclear weapon to bargain for direct negotiation with the US and gradually get out of China’s influence. In 1953, North Korea and the US signed Armistice Agreement, but since then, the North Korea and South Korea have enjoyed no peace. As a result, it is necessary to negotiate again to replace the Armistice Agreement by another peace agreement. After the success of the third nuclear test and a series of missile tests, North Korea stated that it has mastered techonology to produce nuclear weapons, so it should be treated as equal to other nuclear weapon states. It also asked the US to hold direct negotiation. Through opportunities like this one, North Korea would gradually get out of its dependence on China.

Fifth, deter the US, South Korea, and China. Recently, the US and South Korea reached an agreement on the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile system on South Korean territory. When this system comes into operation, it can closely observe North Korea’s nuclear facilities. Through its nuclear test, North Korea intended to send a message to the US and South Korea that it does not want its nuclear facilities to be observed by the US and South Korea’s modern surveillance systems. It is intended to be a deterrence to the US and South Korea.

Since China’s President Xi Jinping took over power in 2013, China has adjusted its foreign policy in the direction that it fosters relations with South Korea while neglecting the relations with North Korea. At the UN Security Council, China voted for sanctions

against North Korea. North Korea acknowledges that due to the importance of security and stability in the North Korea-China border region, China would not totally side with the West to impose sanctions on North Korea, it would use the 'game-card' to cause disagreements among international community on North Korea's nuclear profile. Security analysts think that it is time North Korea bypassed China and used nuclear weapons to bargain with international community.

### **Likely Scenario Ahead**

In the times to come, the Korean peninsular situation will witness complicated developments. Though they are unlikely to escalate to wars, however, the risk exists. It is anticipated that the situation could go in the following directions :-

- (a) North Korea clearly knows its real military power, particularly the consequences of a nuclear war. At this moment, the military balance is not to North Korea's advantage. Though North Korea has more than double military strength in comparison to South Korea (1,290,000 to 655,000),<sup>13</sup> its capability in modern combined operations is limited; most of its ground and air force weapons are outdated; only some have been upgraded. Meanwhile, South Korea's armed forces are equipped with more modern weapons. In addition, it has the support from 28,500 US military personnel stationed in South Korea and another 36,000 US military personnel stationed in Japan.
- (b) The focus of North Korea's policy in the years to come will be to develop its economy and nuclear capability. Therefore, it will gather all potentials for economic development. North Korea Supreme People's Assembly passed the programme for economic and nuclear capability developments. These are long-term goals that North Korea will continue to give priority to.
- (c) North Korea is faced with a number of difficulties. Politically, it is isolated from the international community due to the United Nations sanctions. There are only a few countries that have officially established relations with North Korea. Economically, North Korea is faced with sanctions of the United Nations, and is struggling with natural disasters.

Meanwhile, it has to gather all potentials to prepare for conflicts and war. Therefore, it is stumbling upon economic crisis and faced with a serious starvation threat (about 6.5 million people are short of food).

In general, none of the involved parties expects a war to break out since it would affect their interests and change the regional situation that could lead to the possibility of a nuclear war.

### **Strategic Implications for Regional Security**

Though paying a high price, North Korea is bent upon developing a strategic nuclear deterrent against present and potential adversaries, which have serious impacts on regional security. The realisation of North Korea's right to own nuclear weapons would create a bad precedent in the regional security.

If North Korea succeeds in realising its right to possess nuclear weapons, it would ignite a new arms race, with some countries seeking to possess nuclear weapons, undermining peace, security and prosperity. Specifically, Iran and Pakistan, often dubbed as the nuclear flashpoints, may be among the list. Iran embarked on its programme of ballistic missiles in 1980, enabling it to have the largest number of missiles being deployed in the Middle East and may become the eighth nuclear weapon state in Asia and the tenth member of the world nuclear club. Pakistan claimed official possession of nuclear bombs in 1987, but its first successful nuclear test was conducted in 1998. Today, Pakistan is capable of launching a nuclear attack through its land-based and airborne missile systems.

North Korea's nuclear weapons could lead to an arms race in the region. Today, both Japan and South Korea are within the reach of North Korean short and medium-range missiles. Whether these missiles are equipped with nuclear warheads or not, they will still pose a serious threat to the security of the two countries. Against this backdrop, Japan and South Korea are compelled to increase their military arsenal to deal with North Korea's nuclear threat. Consequently, Northeast Asia will be locked into an arms race, which may turn into a real war.

In addition, North Korea's nuclear weapons programme may be used as a pretext by other countries to raise their military spending and acquisition of defence systems, undermining the

economy-centric policy of countries in East Asia. Perhaps more alarmingly, there could be groups of non-state actors taking advantage of North Korea's nuclear programme to get hold of nuclear weapons. Northeast Asia, therefore, could become home to a number of nuclear powers. In the absence of timely preventive measures, complex political regimes and international relations in East Asia could drive this region into the first major nuclear war in human history.

There is a possibility of North Korea's nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist groups. North Korea is an underdeveloped economy. It has almost no industrial or agricultural products for export. Thus, nuclear technology and missiles could be its most important goods to sell for hard currency. During such technology transfers, nuclear and missile technologies would risk falling into the hands of terrorist and extremist groups. Thus, terrorist attacks would be no longer "suicide bombings," but "dirty bomb" terror attacks.

There is also a possibility of nuclear disaster. At the moment, North Korea is positioning its nuclear facilities around Yongbyon area, thus in case of a fire or an environmental incident, the disaster would be more serious than the Ukraine's Chernobyl, in 1986. While the Chernobyl nuclear incident was caused by technical glitch and the carelessness of the operators; in the future the nuclear disaster would be caused by intention, particularly, the attacks by terrorists and criminals. As a result, its consequences would be unprecedented and have a long-term impact.

### Endnotes

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# China Pakistan Economic Corridor – Current Status with Focus on Energy Sector

Commander MH Rajesh®

## Introduction

The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a flagship project of One Belt One Road (OBOR). It was one of the earliest initiatives under its ambit, announced in 2013 for a trusted ally and with a large budgetary outlay of USD 40-50 bn.<sup>1</sup> It deploys idle capital and infrastructure capacities of China in the neighbourhood in a Sinocentric fashion. It rebrands Chinese economic and foreign policy under one umbrella giving it a recall value and synergy, as a strategy for growth. CPEC lays an economic 'weft' over existing strategic 'warp' on China-Pakistan relationship.

CPEC includes mines, generation and transmission projects in energy segment, fibre optics, and sea and land ports spread across Pakistan. It has a prominent transportation spine; albeit not a continuous one, with road, rail and seaport projects in separate segments. At the sea ward end, it originates from Gwadar in Baluchistan, winds through a yet undecided trajectory, enhances certain sections of existing roads that lead up to the Karakoram Highway which thence leads to Kashgar in Xinjiang, China. It aspires to integrate Pakistan's economy with China, in turn connecting China to Indian Ocean bypassing the Malacca. President Xi Jinping's words sum it up as '*(Pakistan and China)* need to form a "1+4" cooperation structure with the Economic Corridor at the centre and the Gwadar Port, energy, infrastructure and industrial cooperation being the four key areas to drive development across Pakistan and deliver tangible benefits to its people".<sup>2</sup>


This article uses data available on Pakistan Government's websites to examine the CPEC addressing spatial distribution of projects, budgetary outlays, and focusses on energy sector which doesn't get the attention it deserves.

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### Types of CPEC Projects

For the purpose of this article, only those projects which have been budgeted as per Pakistan Government websites at the time of writing this article have been considered for study. Unbudgeted projects have been listed but not used for calculations. It has been observed that the list of projects has varied over time due to political pressures. Present investment amounts to about USD 41.7 bn (refer to **Annexure 1**). The comparative share is depicted in the **Figure 1** below.



**Figure 1 : Investments in the CPEC (road, rail, dry port and fibre optics is shown as infrastructure)**

### The Transportation Network

The central spine of the corridor involves the following:-

- (a) **Roads.** The CPEC presently invests only in two specific road segments.
  - (i) The Karakoram Highway (KKH) between Havelian and Thakot (USD 1.3 bn).
  - (ii) Sukkur-Multan Section (USD 2.8 bn).

(iii) CPEC in its initial tranche had no investments in western alignment in Baluchistan. However, there is now a plan of a network of roads in western regions with unbudgeted work in Roads Khuzdar-Basima and DI Khan-Zhob. The Thakot-Raikot section in KKH inside PoK has also recently emerged as an unbudgeted CPEC project. These have been included after the 6<sup>th</sup> Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) meet in December 2016 in Beijing and made public in early 2017.

(b) **Rail.** In rail connectivity, focus of investments has been on the main railway line (ML1) of Pakistan which carries 70 per cent of the national traffic. This line will be improved for higher speeds. The original investment of USD 3,650 mn has been enhanced with a second tranche after 6th JCC meeting. In connection with the rail investment, CPEC envisages a dry port at northern most railhead, at Havelian.

(c) **Port.** The main investment is in Gwadar Port. Though, less than two per cent of the total CPEC investment, it is the geographic spot in OBOR where the land and maritime networks converge. There is a gamut of investments here including port works, airport, projects to deal with water shortage and projects as listed in **Annexure 1**. Gwadar's commercial viability is suspect, considering its distance from circumequatorial navigation route and lack of rail connectivity with hinterland. There are plans to include Keti Bandar Port in the CPEC projects.

(d) **Fibre Optic Link.** A key project is Pakistan-China Fibre Optic Project at a cost of USD 44 mn. This will enhance telecommunication through the Gilgit Baltistan Region and is handled by Strategic Communication Organisation. This will connect Rawalpindi with Kashgar.

### **Focus on Energy- Pakistan Power Sector**

Focus area of this article is energy projects in CPEC which constitute 79 per cent of the total investments. The reason for this is the dismal energy situation in Pakistan. Given that energy is central to any economy, issues in energy affects industries with cascading effects on investor sentiments, growth and employment

etc. Estimates reveal that power shortage results in a loss of GDP of 2-2.5 per cent annually to Pakistan. Pakistan's power sector presently faces multiple problems as enumerated below :-

The power sector in that country has following problems:-

(a) **Shortage.** Pakistan's installed energy capacity is 25 GW. While demand for energy is 17 GW, production hovers around 12-15 GW. They have a power shortage of about 5 GW.<sup>3</sup> There is also a shortage in transmission capacity, which was around 16,300 MW in 2015<sup>4</sup> whereby, even if all the shortages in generation were resolved, the transmission capacity would limit its distribution. CPEC, therefore, includes generation and transmission projects.

(b) **Cost of Electricity.** Pakistan has very high electricity production cost. Pakistan charges the consumer an average of PKR 16.95 for a unit of electricity whereas in India it is PKR 7.36, Bangladesh PKR 5.47, and US PKR 8.59.<sup>5</sup> This high cost also results in non-payment of bills.

(c) **Use of Costly Fuel.** The primary cause of this high production cost of electricity is present mix of fuel that it used for generation of electricity. Pakistan produces electricity using oil (35 per cent), natural gas (29 per cent), hydroelectricity (30 per cent) and nuclear (five per cent) energy and imports from Iran (one per cent). This mix avoids coal. Though coal is considered a polluting fuel, it is cheap. India uses 60 per cent Coal and China uses 70 per cent coal in production of electricity. However, Pakistan energy sector evolved differently avoiding the use of coal. This contrasts pattern of developing nations and has resulted in the present high cost of electricity.

(d) **Subsidy and Circular Debt.** High cost results in subsidies from the government, which in turn affects economy. Despite the subsidy, the cost to the consumer is high; resulting in non-payment and power theft which triggers a 'circular debt'. This describes the vicious cycle where consumer doesn't pay the distribution company, affecting payments to transmission, generation and fuel companies. This results in debts, stoppage of production and power cuts. Currently the overall debt in power sector is around USD 5 bn.

(e) **High Import Bill.** Pakistan imports far more goods than it exports resulting in an unfavourable balance of payment situation. The oil and gas used for electricity generation in Pakistan is imported and constitutes 35 per cent of the import bill. It has forex reserves of only USD 20 bn. Its economy is under an extended fund facility by IMF who has already issued a warning pertaining to energy sector as well as CPEC payments. The GDP of Pakistan is USD 290 bn whereas the present external debt is USD 79 bn, or 30 per cent of GDP which is large as compared to other similar economies. If fuel import bill and low exports grow unchecked, the balance of payment and debt situation will only worsen.

### **CPEC Solutions in Energy Sector – Problems and Prospects**

The CPEC promises several solutions in its fold. Firstly, it increases power capacity- bringing in three times the current shortage. Secondly, it infuses coal and renewables into the current energy mix reducing overall cost, since coal is cheaper than oil and gas. It is expected that this will reduce the foreign exchange requirements to some degree, though not all. Pakistan's oil import bill was USD 14.77 bn in 2014 and was down to USD 7 bn in 2016. This reduction was primarily due to low oil prices.<sup>6</sup> A cheaper fuel like coal will indeed decrease cost of imports further and provides options to Pakistan making its electricity generation cost far less vulnerable to price shocks driven by a single commodity in a volatile market.

In case the Chinese want to undertake any investment or industrial cooperation in Pakistan as President Xi Jinping has indicated, the power situation in Pakistan must improve in these multiple areas in a comprehensive manner. It is with this aim of preparing the ground for further investments that energy appears a core focus area in CPEC. A total of 16000 mw of energy projects are being launched under CPEC in which 10,400 mw are priority early harvest projects. Therefore, presently the planned investment is roughly three times the shortfall. This indicates that some legacy high cost plants may be shut down in the future. Of these new 16000 mw projects being created, 12000 mw constitute coal based energy projects. Rest of the projects are renewables. Notably oil is totally avoided in CPEC projects. What this high coal infusion

will do to energy mix is that from near zero coal use in overall electricity generation pre-CPEC, Pakistan will produce 30 per cent of its energy using coal and renewables. Please refer to **Figures 2, 3** and **4** for the transition infused by CPEC. This is one core attribute of CPEC.




Figure 2 : Type of Fuel presently Used in Pakistan




Figure 3 : Type of Fuel Mix CPEC




Figure 4 : Type of Fuel Post CPEC

### Will Coal Solve the problem?

Since transition to coal, when rest of the world is weaning from coal, is a major element of CPEC, more analysis on coal is necessary. A vast majority of the coal based power plants coming up in CPEC are supercritical plants which are capable of working at higher temperatures. They also use imported high calorific coal. Pakistan doesn't have reserves of this variety of bituminous coal. Its reserves are mostly lignite, or low calorific coal (Please refer to **Table 1**). Hence barring power plants like Thar and Engro which are co-located with coal mines; high grade coal will be imported from abroad and, therefore, does not solve external dependency or balance of trade and payment problems which legacy energy sources had imposed. Coal based power will also add to climate change which a country like Pakistan, which has borne extreme weather calamities in recent years has to be concerned about.<sup>7</sup>

Table 1: Pakistan's Coal situation

Type of Coal	Bitumen	Lignite	Coke gas	Coking coal	Blast furnace
Production	2383	1168	81		733
Import	2645	-	-	115	-

Source : International Energy Agency<sup>8</sup>

### High Interest Rate of Energy

Unlike the infrastructure segment, where government is deeply involved, the energy field of CPEC mostly involves Sino-Pak private partnership. Chinese banks will finance these private investments at 5-6 per cent interest rate. The Government of Pakistan will be contractually obliged to purchase electricity from those firms at pre-negotiated rates and provide a sovereign guarantee. This is at a high rate of PKR 18 per unit. Pakistan already has a consumer rate of PKR 16.95, which is the highest in the SAARC region. This high rate in CPEC according an analyst *'is a classical colony-making exercise by China, which Pakistan establishment and the Army is quite excited with'*.<sup>9</sup> Chinese firms seek a revolving fund backed by sovereign, amounting to 22 per cent of power tariffs,<sup>10</sup> which could amount to USD 700 mn annually for all projects if local firms default.<sup>11</sup> This could be unfavourable to Pakistan in the long term. However, Pakistan's energy and economic scenario being where it is today, it has little choice but to take this bitter pill. The debt equity ratio of energy projects are to the order of 25 per cent equity: 75 per cent debt. The loan in addition to interest carries insurance fees of 7 per cent with Sinasure, the Chinese insurance arm. The returns on equity for these projects is at a very high rate of upto 34 per cent, which will eventually be borne by the consumer.<sup>12</sup>

### Cost of Installation

The CPEC will eventually add a 16 GW capacity in energy generation at a cost of USD 34 bn which is at the rate of USD 2 bn per GW when all projects are considered. Power Plant installation estimations in CPEC varies from wind power installation at USD 2.5 bn /GW, solar USD 1.35 bn /GW, USD Hydro 1.9-2.68 bn /GW, Coal USD 0.8-1.5 bn /GW as per calculations by the author; whereas, India routinely builds its thermal power plants at a cost less than USD 01 bn /GW.<sup>13</sup> Hence, CPEC power plants are above normal costs. This will benefit the investors both in Pakistan and China. China also gets a near 100 per cent offset, benefitting Chinese firms, besides the sovereign guarantee and power purchase commitments.

### Other Issues

Pakistan energy sector also suffers from load management problem, poor technology, theft, subsidies, free power and

overstaffing etc.<sup>14</sup> Electricity transmission is also a problem in Pakistan. Except Punjab, all other provinces, especially Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan have a suboptimal power distribution system and lack the capacity to take the additional load and deliver it to the consumers.<sup>15</sup>

### **Specifics of Thermal Plants and Coal**

As far as new coal power plants being built under CPEC are concerned, they mostly use supercritical technology. A supercritical power plant operates with higher thermal efficiency compared to normal plants. Therefore, it can extract more heat out of coal. These plants demand superior metallurgy in its construction. The new set of power plants barring the Sino Sindh (SSRL) mine mouth water plant and Thar Engro, use imported coal as well. Pakistan doesn't have high calorific coal reserves too, which needs to be imported. The coal reserves of Pakistan are concentrated in Thar and Salt Range area where only lignite, a low calorific coal is available. Lignite is not an economical fuel when transported to distant location. The lower the quality of coal, the higher the transport cost as a percentage of overall coal cost. Both these mines have subcritical plants integral to them in CPEC plans considering advantages of co-location. Since a majority of coal plants will use imported, high calorific coal, which Pakistan doesn't possess, they will continue to impact the import bill albeit lesser in value than oil. This will be, in all likelihood, sourced from Australia or Indonesia opening new sea-lanes of communications and resource politics.

### **Regional Spread of Projects**

Regionally, the power projects are more in Sindh, Baluchistan and Punjab with two projects namely the Karot and Kohala Hydel Project planned in PoK. However, the locations of major projects of Balochistan are adjacent to Karachi in Gaddani leaving vast swathes of rest of Balochistan devoid of any energy project. Only less than 2 per cent gets invested there considering Gaddani could be cancelled as per some reports. If one were to connect the dots representing energy projects, the notional eastern alignment becomes more prominent avoiding most of Baluchistan. The road between Multan and Sukkur is also on the Eastern side. Hence, one must conclude that the Western alignment remains aspirational with projects mostly along the eastern portion of Pakistan (Please

refer to **Figure 6**, stars indicate projects which have been budgeted).




Figure 5 : CPEC projects based on Provinces (except rail)



Figure 6 : Power projects of CPEC (denoted by stars) and approximate road segments in red showing the eastern bias<sup>16</sup>

## Conclusion

CPEC is more about energy projects and less about corridor. On blueprint it is a plan addressing some core concerns of economy where corridor is a metaphor that will deepen the relation with strategic implications to the region. There is no 'one' continuous road or even an alignment in CPEC as etched in most mental maps. Contrary to official positions there is a noticeable bias in projects to the prosperous eastern provinces ignoring Baluchistan. This short shrift can accentuate current fissures. Only by easing the deep energy crisis within Pakistan can it be of any use to China for OBOR. In energy domain CPEC is a bitter pill of coal infusion in energy mix. However, only deep reforms can turn Pakistan's energy and economic situation around. CPEC will give rise to new resource politics for coal. China's Malacca Dilemma may also not be mitigated through this corridor, even as Pakistan portrays it to be. Cost of transportation simply doesn't serve economic logic hauling energy to Xinjiang which is not only oil rich, but also the terminus of Central Asian pipelines coming to China. The ability of Pakistan to absorb the investments in given period and thereafter pay back is also suspect considering historic trends. Hence, these debts could eventually become strategic equities for China, especially the Gwadar Port, which can worsen security in South Asia.

As far as India is concerned, CPEC has added a layer of complexity with more projects in PoK being drawn into its ambit without taking Indian concerns on board. That makes projects in contested areas politically vulnerable. If CPEC and OBOR are actually about regional economic growth, as the lending nation, China should rethink about investment in PoK and roll them back. Currently, it appears that the narrative is driven by Pakistan only with very little Chinese statements in the open. After all, it is not easy for any nation to grow ignoring the security and possibilities on the cards held by a rising India. This is especially relevant at a time of weak cues from global economy and western fatigue about globalisation. A stable and peaceful South Asia is crucial for Asia led growth. Investments in contested areas, does not augur well for that purpose, it will distance India further from any China led initiatives like OBOR.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> "With a New Chinese Loan, CPEC Is Now Worth \$51.5bn," *DAWN.COM*, September 30, 2016, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1287040>.

<sup>2</sup> "Important Documents," accessed August 29, 2016, [http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbqx/importantdocuments/.2015/04/20 Chin-Pak Dosti Zindabad HE Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China](http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbqx/importantdocuments/.2015/04/20%20Chin-Pak%20Dosti%20Zindabad%20HE%20Xi%20Jinping%20President%20of%20the%20People's%20Republic%20of%20China)

<sup>3</sup> To provide a comparative perspective, India generates 300Gw and Delhi's peak consumption is 6Gw.

<sup>4</sup> Power transmission capacity surges to 16,300 MW, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1192470>, accessed October 4, 2016.

<sup>5</sup> "Electricity Shock: 'Pakistanis Paying Highest Tariffs in Region,'" *The Express Tribune*, January 31, 2014, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/665548/electricity-shock-pakistanis-paying-highest-tariffs-in-region/>.

<sup>6</sup> "Pakistan Saved \$4.5bn on Oil Imports in FY16," DAWN.COM, July 24, 2016, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1272751>.

<sup>7</sup> The dangers of Pakistan's coal revival, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1242279>, accessed October 4, 2016

<sup>8</sup> "IEA - Report," accessed October 18, 2016, <http://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/report/?year=2014&country=PAKISTAN&product=Coal>.

<sup>9</sup> China-Pak Economic Corridor: Why Gwadar Is An Overrated Port, <http://swarajyamag.com/world/china-pak-economic-corridor-why-gwadar-is-an-overrated-port>, accessed September 26, 2016

<sup>10</sup> "ECC Approves Plan to Set up Special Funds for CPEC Projects."

<sup>11</sup> Pal, "The China-Pakistan Corridor Is All About Power. Not Electricity, but the Real Thing."

<sup>12</sup> "China-Pak Economic Corridor: Why Gwadar Is An Overrated Port," accessed September 26, 2016, <http://swarajyamag.com/world/china-pak-economic-corridor-why-gwadar-is-an-overrated-port>.

<sup>13</sup> "Windfall for Chinese on Coal Fired Projects," *The Express Tribune*, February 15, 2017, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1327172/windfall-chinese-coal-fired-projects/>.

<sup>14</sup> Roberts and Sattar, "Pakistan's Economic Disarray and How to Fix It." <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/06/pakistans-economic-disarray-and-how-to-fix-it> accessed October 4, 2016,

<sup>15</sup> Government fails to satisfy opposition over CPEC issues, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1292529/government-fails-to-satisfy-opposition-over-cpec-issues>, accessed October 27, 2016

<sup>16</sup> Prepared by author using Google Map, road sections in red are approximate. Non-budgeted projects not shown.

<sup>17</sup> "CPEC | China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Official Website," accessed February 17, 2017, <http://cpec.gov.pk/#>.

## Annexure 1

### Overall Status of CPEC Projects<sup>17</sup>

Project	Quant	Cost (\$ mn)	Technology	Location	Province
<b>Energy Coal (Priority)</b>					
Port Qasim Electric Company Coal Fired, 2x660	1320mw	1,980	Supercritical	Port Qasim	Sindh
Sahiwal 2x660MW Coal-fired Power Plant	1320	1,600	Supercritical	Sahiwal	Punjab
Engro thar 4x330MW Coal-fired,	1320	2,000	Sub Critical	Thar-Block-II	Sindh
Surface mine in Block II of Thar Coal field, 6.5 metric ton per annum (mtpa),		1,470	Open Pit	Thar-Block-II	Sindh
Gwadar Coal /LNG / Oil Power Project	300	600	Not Decided	Gwadar	Balochistan
HUBCO coal power plant 1X660 MW	660	970	Supercritical	Hub	Baluchistan
Rahimyar Khan Coal Power Project	1320	1,600	Supercritical	Rahimyar Khan	Punjab
SSRL Thar Coal Block 1- 6.5 metric ton per annum(mpta)		1,300	Open Pit	Thar-Block-I	Sindh
SSRL 2x660 MW Mine Mouth Power Plant	1320	2,000	Subcritical	Thar-Block-I	Sindh
<b>Energy Coal (Actively Promoted)</b>					
Gaddani Power Park Project (2x660MW)	1320	3,960		Gaddani	Baluchistan
HUBCO coal power plant 1X660 MW	660	970	Supercritical	Hub	Baluchistan
Thar mine mouth oracle, Thar Sindh	1320	1,300		Thar	Sindh
Muzaffargarh Coal Power Project, Punjab	1320	1,600	Subcritical	Muzzafar garh	Punjab
<b>Energy Renewables (Priority)</b>					
Quaid-e-Azam 1000MW Solar Park, Bahawalpur, Punjab	1000	1,350	PV	Bahawalpur	Punjab

<u>Project</u>	<u>Quant</u>	<u>Cost (\$ mn)</u>	<u>Technology</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Province</u>
Dawood 50MW wind Farm,	50	125	Wind Turbine	Bhambore, Sindh	Bhambore, Sindh
UEP 100MW wind Farm,	100	250	Wind Turbine	Jhimpir, Sindh	Jhimpir, Sindh
Sachal 50MW Wind Farm,	50	134	Wind Turbine	Jhimpir, Sindh	Jhimpir, Sindh
Suki Kinari Hydro power Station, KPK	870	1,802	Hydel	Suki Kinari	KPK
Karot Hydropower Station,	720	1,420	Hydel	Karot	PoK & Punjab
<b>Energy Renewables (Actively Promoted)</b>					
Kohala Hydel Project,	1100	2,397	hydel	Kohala	PoK
Pakistan Wind Farm II 2X50 MW	100	150	Wind Turbine	Jhimpir	Sindh
<b>Energy transmission Infrastructure (Priority)</b>					
Matari to Lahore Transmission line	-	1,500	-	-	Sindh and Punjab
Matari to Faisalabad Transmission line	-	1,420	-	-	Sindh and Punjab
<b>Energy Infrastructure (Actively Promoted)</b>					
Gaddani Power Park Project (Jetty + Infrastructure)	-	1,200	-	Gaddani	Baluchistan
<b>Road</b>				-	
KKH Phase II (Thakot - Havelian Section)	118km	1,305	-	-	KPK
Peshawar-Karachi Motorway (Multan-Sukkur Section)	392	2,846	-	-	Punjab Sind
Khuzdar-Basima Road N-30 (110 km)	110	NA	-	-	Baluchistan
Upgradation of D.I.Khan-Zhob, N-50 Phase-I (210 km)	210	NA	-	-	KPK Baluchistan
KKH Thakot-Raikot N35 remaining portion (136 Km)	136	NA	-	-	KPK, PoK

<b>Project</b>	<b>Quant</b>	<b>Cost (\$ mn)</b>	<b>Technology</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Province</b>
<b>Rail</b>			-	-	
Expansion and reconstruction of existing Line ML-1	1736	3,650	-	-	
Havelian Dry port (450 M. Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units)	-	40	-	-	KPK
Capacity Development of Pakistan Railways	-	NA	-	-	-
<b>Gwadar</b>			-	-	
Gwadar East-Bay Expressway	-	140.6	-	Gwadar	Baluchistan
New Gwadar International Airport	-	230	-	Gwadar	Baluchistan
Construction of Breakwaters	-	123	-	Gwadar	Baluchistan
Dredging of berthing areas & channels	-	27	-	Gwadar	Baluchistan
Development of Free Zone	-	32	-	Gwadar	Baluchistan
Necessary facilities of fresh water treatment, water supply and distribution	-	130	-	Gwadar	Baluchistan
Pak China Friendship Hospital	-	100	-	Gwadar	Baluchistan
Technical and Vocational Institute at Gwadar	-	10	-	Gwadar	Baluchistan
Gwadar Smart Port City Master Plan	-	NA	-	Gwadar	Baluchistan
Bao Steel Park, petrochemicals, stainless steel and other industries in Gwadar	-	NA	-	Gwadar	Baluchistan
Development of Gwadar University (Social Sector Development)	-	NA	-	Gwadar	Baluchistan
Upgradation and development of fishing, boat making and maintenance services to protect and promote livelihoods of local population	-	NA	-	Gwadar	Baluchistan

<u>Project</u>	<u>Quant</u>	<u>Cost (\$ mn)</u>	<u>Technology</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Province</u>
<b><u>Digital Connectivity</u></b>			-		
Cross Border Optical Fiber Cable	-	44	-	-	
Pilot Project of Digital Terrestrial Multimedia Broadcast (DTMB)	-	NA	-	-	
<b><u>Urban Transit</u></b>			-		
Karachi Circular Railway	-	NA	-	Karachi	Sindh
Greater Peshawar Region Mass Transit	-	NA	-	Peshawar	KPK
Quetta Mass Transit	-	NA	-	Quetta	Baluchistan
Orange Line - Lahore	-	NA	-	Lahore	Punjab
<b><u>Provincial Projects</u></b>			-		
Keti Bunder Sea Port Development Project	-	NA	-	Keti Bunder	Sindh
Naukundi-Mashkhel-Panjgur Road Project connecting with M-8 & N-85	-	NA	-	-	Baluchistan
Chitral CPEC link road from Gilgit, Shandor, Chitral to Chakdara	-	NA	-	-	Gilgit KPK
Mirpur – Muzaffarabad - Mansehra Road Construction for connectivity with CPEC route	-	NA	-	-	PoK KPK Punjab
Quetta Water Supply Scheme from Pat feeder Canal, Balochistan	-	NA	-	Quetta	Baluchistan
Iron Ore Mining, Processing & Steel Mills complex at Chiniot, Punjab	-	NA	-	Chiniot	Punjab
<b><u>Economic Zones</u></b>			-		
Rashakai Economic Zone on M-1	-	NA	-	Rashakai	KPK
Special Economic Zone Dhabeji	-	NA	-	Dhabeji	Sindh
Bostan Industrial Zone	-	NA	-	Bostan	Baluchistan

<b>Project</b>	<b>Quant</b>	<b>Cost (\$ mn)</b>	<b>Technology</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Province</b>
<b>Punjab - China Economic Zone, M-2 District Sheikhupura</b>	-	NA	-	Sheikhupura	Punjab
<b>ICT Model Industrial Zone, Islamabad</b>	-	NA	-	Islamabad	-
<b>Development of Industrial Park on Pakistan Steel Mills Land at Port Qasim near Karachi</b>	-	NA	-	Port Qasim	Sind
<b>Bhimber Industrial Zone</b>	-	NA	-	Bhimber	PoK
<b>Mohmand Marble City</b>	-	NA	-	Mohmand	KPK
<b>Moqpondass SEZ Gilgit-Baltistan</b>	-	NA	-	Moqpondass	GB, PoK

# Unique Approach to Comprehensive National Power through the Lens of *Kautilya's Arthashastra*

Lieutenant Colonel Malay Mishra®

## Introduction

Comprehensive National Power (CNP) evokes different meanings across the globe, each one having a different perspective of 'power of nation'. The purpose of studying 'power' has a deep interest particularly amongst those whose full-time job it is to predict the behaviour of nations, especially when nations seem to amass "power" and rise.

Unsurprisingly, thus, India's rise in the twenty-first century has drawn attention of the scholars worldwide. Global-watchers remain perplexed as to how India would behave when it amasses sufficient power to decisively influence world-affairs, particularly when few regard India as a rising superpower. Coupled with that arises the global interest in India's own interpretation of "state-power" and its use. To quench this, comes the unique approach to CNP through the lens of *Arthashastra*.

Long before the western world even became civilised, Kautilya in *Arthashastra*, the pioneering masterpiece on statecraft, theorised the term called '*Shakti*/power'.<sup>1</sup> Interestingly, Kautilya is also credited to have masterminded the largest-ever empire in the Indian subcontinent: the Mauryan Empire. With a population of about 50 million people, this Empire extending from the border of Persia to Bengal was larger than both the Mughal and the British Empires of later times. Hence, the approach to "state-power" in *Arthashastra* is gradually drawing unprecedented attention in the scholarly world. This article aims to establish the uniqueness of *Arthashastra's* approach to CNP. In order to understand the Kautilyan approach it would be mandatory to weigh the contemporary approaches to CNP.

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### **Contemporary Approaches to CNP and their Shortcomings**

According to a commonly accepted definition, CNP is described as “comprehensive capability of a country to pursue its strategic objectives by taking necessary actions internationally”. It is also defined as “degree of ability to mobilise strategic resources to realise national objectives.”<sup>2</sup> Although, to measure CNP, different factors are considered by different scholars, the commonly recognised factors mainly include economy, military, natural resources, human capital, foreign policy and diplomacy.

Evolution path of interpreting “state-power” has been dominated primarily by the western thought, and more recently by the Chinese construct. Unsurprisingly, the positions vary.

#### **Western Construct**

The ‘power’ in the western thought bears a heavy influence of Western “Realist theory” of International Relations (IR). According to this theory, the power distribution in the international arena is a ‘zero-sum-game’, where a state amasses power at the cost of other states for its survival, and thus attaining power becomes ‘all-in-one’ goal: ends, ways and means. The power in this theory emanates from mainly two dimensions: military and economic dimensions. Nations, thence, can be called as ‘Superpower’, ‘Great-Power’, ‘Middle-Power’ and ‘Regional-Power’.

Joseph Nye modified the Western discourse by introducing ‘Soft’ and ‘Hard power’ concept, and soon emerged the third concept of power called ‘Smart Power’. While the ‘Hard’ power refers to coercive tactics signifying the use of armed forces, economic sanctions and other forms of intimidation, the ‘Soft’ power denotes power to influence using diplomacy, cultural values and ideology to achieve political ends. The ‘Smart’ power, on the other hand, incorporates variable and clever synthesis of powers, ranging from soft to hard power, across the spectrum of statecraft tools. Nonetheless, the Western narrative on “power formulation” remained inclined towards hard-power components.

Various power-assessment formulas developed by western scholars such as Clifford-German, Singer and Cline are enumerated in **Table 1**.<sup>3</sup> Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) developed by Singer is the foremost index to calculate CNP

worldwide. It is evident from the **Table 1** that all these approaches use mainly “material” powers (hard powers), hence are not truly comprehensive.

**Table 1**

S No	Source	Year	Formula Expression
(a)	David Singer	1963	$CINC = (TPR + UPR + ISPR + ECR + MER + MPR)/6$ Ratio is country/world. Where TPR = total population of country ratio UPR = urban population of country ratio ISPR = iron and steel production of country ratio ECR = primary energy consumption ratio MER = military expenditure ratio MPR = military personnel ratio
(b)	Clifford German	1960	$Power = N \times (L + P + I + M),$ Where N = nuclear capability, L = land, I = industrial base, and M = military.
(c)	Cline	1975	$Power = (C + E + M) \times (S + W),$ Where C = critical mass (population and territory), E = economic capability, M = military, S = strategic purpose, and W = national will.
(d)	Small and Singer	1982	$Power = (ME + AF + IP + EC + UP + TP)/6$ Where ME = military, AF = armed forces, IP = iron production, EC = energy consumption, UP = urban population, and TP = total population.
(e)	Kadera and Sorokin	2004	$Power = (ME \times AF \times IP \times EC \times UP \times TP)^{1/6},$ Where symbols are the same as Small and Singer's model above.
(f)	Chang	2004	$Power = (CM + E + M)/3$ Where CM = critical mass (population + land area), E = economy, and M = military.

### Chinese Construct

“CNP” or ‘*Zonghe Gouli*’ is basically of Chinese origin. While westerners talked of ‘National Power’, Chinese scholars developed their own concept and devised Comprehensive National Power. Unlike westerners, they expanded the scope beyond conventional military and economic domains.<sup>4</sup>

Despite having Chinese origin, CNP concept has no common agreement even amongst Chinese scholars. Please refer **Table 2**.<sup>5</sup> Fascinatingly, the two prime institutions of China,

Academy of Military Science (AMS)<sup>6</sup> and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)<sup>7</sup> differ immensely, as described below:-

**Table 2**

S No	Source	Description	Remarks
(a)	China's Academy of Military Science (AMS) of the People's Liberation Army (PLA),	Index System comprises <b>four major index</b> subsystems with sub-indices: - <b>Material or hard power index</b> (Economic wealth, natural resources, science and tech, military might); - <b>Spirit or soft power index</b> (Pol power, foreign affairs, culture, education); - <b>Coordinated power index</b> (Line of cmd, leadership in policy decision-making); - <b>Environmental index.</b>	Each sub-index has its own <b>sub-subindices</b> called 'CNP appraisal index system'. Sub-subindices of political power sub-index, for instance, includes national strategic goals, political stability and decision-making capability
(b)	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)	Comprises <b>eight aspects</b> with 64 indices: - Natural resources - Economic activities - Foreign economic activities - Science and tech - Social development - Military might - Govt regulation and control capacity - Diplomatic power.	<b>Natural resources</b> (Population, life expectancy, total land, energy sources, including coal, oil, natural gas), <b>Economic activities</b> (GDP, proportion of tertiary sector), <b>Foreign economic activities</b> (International res, gold res), <b>Science and tech</b> (R&D, scientists and engineers), <b>Social development</b> (Education, literacy rate, urbanization rate, healthcare), <b>Military</b> (Manpower, military expenditure, nuclear warheads), <b>Govt regulation and control capacity</b> (Govt spending as a percentage of GDP) <b>Diplomatic power.</b>

### Shortcomings in the Western Approach

In the Western approach, the shortcomings can be enumerated as under:-

- (a) They focus mainly on hard powers, hence do not represent true "comprehensiveness". The core of all indices is mainly economic and military dimensions.

(b) They treat “power-assessment-formulas” as ‘resource containers’, giving more emphasis to “material resources”. It is a widely understood fact that there exist many intangible factors which play heavily on the manifestation of state-power, without which the approach to CNP would remain hollow.

(c) The soft-power, though recognised, is unduly underplayed when it comes to practical formulation vis-à-vis hard-power.

### **Shortcomings in the Chinese Approach**

Chinese approach appears more encompassing but only on superficial scrutiny. A deep study reveals much more than what meets the eye. It endeavoured to define the concept by overcoming certain lacunae, however, displayed the following shortcomings :-

(a) Though the non-material resources are included in formulation, their importance is not correspondingly expressive. For example, in CASS index the weightage-coefficient of diplomacy, which is 0.07, is significantly lesser than that of economic factor which is 0.35.<sup>8</sup>

(b) Economic and military domains form the core of the CNP concept. Many intangibles are not taken into account.

(c) It misses the sustainability factor as a defining factor for growing CNP. If seen scientifically, assessing CNP from the present capability only paints a partial picture. A genuine assessment should cater for futuristic ‘price-factor’ for present day development. This includes future challenges/negative consequences, either intended or unintended, which may stem from the present day unbalanced growth, uneven development, environmental degradation, and political environment. In case of China, this argument gets more pronounced.

(d) It is evident that the Chinese indices are more or less designed to fit China’s advantage, not surprisingly elevating China’s position in the CNP merit. This narrative is hugely being supported by the Chinese leadership.

(e) The question of quality *versus* quantity has not been factored as a determining factor. Assessing CNP quantitatively alone would remain a half-truth. A true power assessment deserves both quantitative and qualitative analysis.

### Common Shortcomings

Certain aspects evidently emerge which are missing in both the major approaches but play a significant role once contrasted against the Kautilyan approach. They include:-


- (a) None explains the question of “so what”, i.e. what to do next with a set of CNP a state possesses.
- (b) The indices are not truly comprehensive in approach.
- (c) Many key non-material dimensions of power matrix are absent, which will emerge from the insightful analysis of the *Arthashastra* based approach to CNP.

### Kautilya's *Saptanga* Model of CNP


Kautilya speaks of seven constituent elements of state, called seven *Prakritis*.<sup>9</sup> Their sum total manifests in “power” of a State. The components in **descending order** of importance are:-<sup>10</sup>

- (a) ‘Swamin’ - ruler.
- (b) ‘Amatya’ - councilors.
- (c) ‘Janapada’ – territory/ resources.
- (d) ‘Durga’ - forts.
- (e) ‘Kosa’ - treasury.
- (f) ‘Bala’ - army.
- (g) ‘Mitra’ - friend/ally.

#### SAPTANGA THEORY OF STATE



There exists a unique analogy. The word *Sapta* means seven, and *anga* means body parts. Hence, *Saptanga* means seven body parts. As an analogy, a State can be considered as a growing organism, and *prakritis* its body parts. All seven body parts are essential for holistic growth of State. However, Kautilya assigned priorities to them with leadership at the top: thus, *Kosa* is more important than *Bala*, *Durga* more important than *Kosa*, *Janapada* more important than *Durga*, and *Swamin* is the most important *Prakriti* for manifestation of power. *Each preceding Prakriti is not only more important but also strengthens the latter*; if one rots, it rots the latter doubly. Hierarchical interaction determines sound and cumulative health of *prakritis* and the “Power”.



**KAUTILYA'S IDEA OF STATE AS ORGANIC BODY<sup>11</sup>**

### ***Saptanga's* Manifestation into "Power"**

The Kautilyan "Power" manifests differently. *Saptanga-model* transcends the idea of "Realist" power (military-economy predominant) and identifies five more distinct power factors, besides *Kosa and Danda*, all being interrelated in hierarchical priority.<sup>12</sup>

### **Three *Shakti(s)***

Seven *prakritis* together manifest into *Shakti* of State. Arthashastra identifies three *shaktis*: ***Prabhava-shakti***, ***Mantra-shakti*** & ***Utsaha-shakti***. While *Prabhava-shakti* (power to generate "effects" like Hard Power) encompasses economy and military power, *Mantra-shakti* (power to influence, counsel, and induce co-opting like Soft Power) incorporates



diplomacy.<sup>13</sup> Uniquely, Arthashastra introduces *Utsaha-shakti* representing the personal power of the leader which provides drive, energy, and direction to other six *prakritis*. Kautilya rates *Mantra-shakti* as the most important of the three. The three powers interact "qualitatively" to produce CNP. For the qualitative analysis, Arthashastra outlines two parameters: "*Sampat* or Excellences" and "*Vyasan*as or Vices" of each *Prakriti*.

Kautilya's mastery rests not only in enumerating *prakritis* but also in devising ways in their qualitative manifestation. In this pursuit, *Arthashastra* first proposes the desired "excellences" to be possessed by each *prakriti* for an ideal "organic-state", and then outlines ethical augmentation of same, aiming to transform ideal *prakritis* into *Shakti*.<sup>14</sup> *Arthashastra* best recommends *dharma*-based moral exhortations to elicit the best out of each element and deprecates use of coercion.

### **Vyasanas or Vices**

Kautilya was pragmatic, as on one hand, he defined the "excellences", on the other, he cautioned the king about the *Vyasana*(s): vices/calamity or nemesis of each *Prakriti*.<sup>15</sup> A leader should be vigilant in foreseeing, averting and overcoming *Vyasanas* to decay of the "organic-body". Priority of *Vyasanas* is same as that of *Prakritis*: that means to save treasury before army; resources before fortifications; and the ruler before all. Kautilya compares the king as "head" of the body. If the king is weak, the enemy will find it easier to intrigue against the State.<sup>16</sup> Cumulatively, "*Prakritis*", "*Sampat*", "*Vyasanas*" and "*Shakti*" manifest into CNP through Kautilyan lens.

### **Uniqueness of Kautilya's *Saptanga* Model of CNP**

The uniqueness gets highlighted in the following points and deserves discrete deliberation:-


- (a) Answering "so what": what to do next with CNP?
- (b) Interconnectedness.
- (c) "*Yogakshema*" (the ethical goal of state power), which provides the ultimate answer to the "so what" question.
- (d) Unique internal insights of *Saptanga* model.

### **Answering "So What"**

What to do with the "power" is answered exquisitely in *Arthashastra* in the form of *Shadgunya*. *Arthashastra* legislates that it is the state of *Prakritis* which makes extrapolative pre-selection of the *Shadgunya* (six fold foreign policy) to operate in system of states called *Mandala*.<sup>17</sup> Thus, on calculation of relative CNP,

*Arthashastra* rationally determines which of the six foreign policies a State should adopt for peaceful growth.

Since *Mandala* (the international relations) remains in eternal flux, it changes dynamically, producing opportunities for some states, while exposing others. The “power equation” among the states keeps fluctuating: foes become allies, allies become foes; fluidity is ubiquitous. To exploit this fluidity, Kautilya introduces the “*Shadgunyas*”, and decrees :-




*“He who sees the six measures of policy as being interdependent in this manner, plays, as he pleases, with the rival kings tied by the chains of his intellect.”<sup>18</sup>*

Simplistically, though not fully, they denote *Sandhi* (“making peace”), *Vigraha* (“hostilities”), *Asana* (“remaining stationary”), *Yana* (“marching/preparing for war”), *Samshraya* (“seeking protection/coalitions”), and *Dvaidibhava* (“dual policy” or “collaboration-cum-competition”).<sup>19</sup>

### The Interconnectedness

In light of *Shadgunyas*, Kautilyan international system can now be understood to be the dynamic application of *shakti*/powers by a state emanating from its *Prakritis* on the neighbouring states amidst the eternal flux of *Mandala* (the international environment), utilising *shadgunya* to augment its power to be *Chakravartin*. Thus there is a strong connection between *Prakritis*, *Shakti* and *Shadgunyas*, as “correlation of CNP of states preselects which *shadgunya* should be gainfully chosen”.<sup>20</sup>

Armed with the *Shaktis* emanating from *Prakritis*, the “organic-body” of state is positioned by Kautilya amidst other states to make choices for foreign policies, which should be chosen only rationally, and not on the whims of the ruler. If the policy is wisely



chosen in accordance with the Kautilyan-sutras giving due weightage to the relative standing of the states, Kautilya claims that the policy would succeed, the state would progress, and internal augmentation of the *Prakritis* would follow soon. This intertwined cycle, thus, continues and augments the cumulative power of State.

### Unique Internal Insights: *Saptanga* Model

There also emerge three unique internal insights on the following aspects of Kautilyan approach:-

- Yogakshema*.
- Kosa versus Danda*.
- Place of *mitra* in the *Saptanga*.

### “*Yogakshema*” - The Ethical Goal of State-Power

*Yogakshema* means “peaceful enjoyment of prosperity and welfare of the ‘subject’”. *Arthashastra* enjoins that *Yogakshema* is the foremost *dharma* of the ruler and perpetually remains the central driving force for power manifestation. *Arthashastra* outlines the aim of “power” as “*Balam shakti; sukham sidhi*”, which means that the *Shaktis* are applied to attain “success” called “*sukham*”

(happiness of the subject), signifying *Yogakshema*.<sup>22</sup> *Yogakshema* alone makes *Arthashastra*-based approach unique, having no parallel in any Western or Chinese discourse discussing “power”. It also ensures a favourable sustainability-factor to the growing CNP in future.

### ***Kosa vs Danda***

Kautilya prioritised *kosa* (treasury) just above *danda* (military). The subtle meaning of placing them together indicates that, first, they are closely interrelated, and secondly, the treasury is not only more important but also an “enabler” of the military force. If carefully studied, *Yogakshema* preaches “peaceful” enjoyment of prosperity, and thus legislates inherent precondition of “security”. Clearly, Kautilya believed that national security was essential to prosperity and thus having a good army was very important. However, he also understood that prosperity was essential to national security since an impoverished country could not have the resources to defend its security. Thus, prosperity and national security are closely inter-dependent. India’s humiliating defeat in 1962 against China is an apt example to clarify that point.

By any standard, *Danda* does not represent “military” alone. “*Danda*” in Sanskrit has numerous meanings: punishment, order-keeping, royal sceptre, discipline enforcer, fine, force and army. In return of the social contract between ruler and the subject, Kautilya authorises the ruler a tool called *Danda*—a legitimate, measured, and “just” coercive authority – for eliminating “*Matsya-Nyaya*” (Big-fish-eats-smaller-fish order) and maintain orderliness in the State. Use of *Danda* in *Saptanga* has similar meaning.

### **“Mitr” – A Unique Dimension**

A unique insight emerges in Kautilya’s incorporating *Mitra* as an ***integral*** contributor element of state for CNP, an insight which is not seen in any modern definition of State. Generally, a *Mitr* remains an outside actor, more so to adjust “Balance-of-power” dynamics. “*Mitr*” as an internal constituent is exclusive to *Arthashastra*. The contemporary world has numerous examples to prove this argument. US too is looking for more *Mitr(s)* in South East Asia in garb of its ‘Pivot Policy’.

### Uniqueness Summarised

Summarily, the uniqueness of *Arthashastra*-based approach emerges in the following:-

- (a) It is truly comprehensive in approach giving due weightage to non-material and material factors. Interactive inclusion of "*Prakritis*", "*Sampat*", "*Vyasanas*" and "*Shakti*" make it more holistic an approach.
- (b) It does not treat power as a "resource-container" (Western thought).
- (c) It establishes relative hierarchy of the seven constituent-elements of State and yet make them interactive with capability to augment/decay other "*Prakritis*".
- (d) It caters for "qualitative" analysis of constituents for CNP determination through "Excellences" and "Vices".
- (e) Unlike Chinese approach, it goes beyond mere inclusion of non-material constituents, but also gives greater weightage to them. It identifies *Mantra-Shakti* as the strongest power component amongst all forms of power.
- (f) It recognises *Mitr* as an inherent constituent element of power determination matrix of a State, which is a unique argument in itself.
- (g) It has an exclusive overbearing of ethical/moral exhortations. The eigenvalue of *Arthashastra* called "*Yogakshema*" adds unprecedented dimension to *Arthashastra*. It significantly caters for sustainability factor, which is found missing in Western as well as Chinese approach.
- (h) It assigns "leadership" the highest priority in seven *Prakritis*. Coupled with Kautilya's unique dimension of *Utsahashakti*, the *swamin* (the leader) becomes a formidable constituent in CNP calculation. Prime Minister Modi at the helm of affairs with his personal drive, energy and giving direction to India's *Prakritis* aptly exemplifies the same.
- (j) It answers the "so what" question by operationalising CNP from *Saptanga* to *Shadgunya* to attain "*Yogakshema*"

which is the ethical goal of state-power. The ethical angle here should not be lost sight of.

(k) Internal insights of *Saptanga*-model make it truly a unique approach.

(l) Remarkable interconnectedness of *Saptanga* model is not only unique but also fosters genuine comprehensiveness to the approach.

### Conclusion

*Saptanga*-model based approach of *Arthashastra* emerges to be comprehensive in true sense of determining CNP. It overcomes the shortcomings of Western as well as Chinese construct of CNP through its insightful and holistic approach building sequentially from the basis of a State to the power manifestation. It even goes beyond to cater for certain intangibles which play key role in manifestation of state power.

The emphasis on ethical value of *Yogakshema*, primacy to non-material capability like *swamin's* ethics, dimension of *Utsaha-shakti* of leadership, inclusion of *Mitr* as the seventh *Prakriti*, placing *danda/army* below *kosa/treasury*, assigning highest priority to *Mantra-shakti*, the “qualitative” analysis of “excellences/vices” of *Prakritis*, all put together make this approach an honorably “comprehensive” and “unique” approach.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Original Kautilya's *Arthashastra* (KA) defines “Shakti / Power” in Book No 9, Chapter No 1, *Sutras* No 135-136; hereafter denoted as KA 9:1.135-136). *Arthashastra* is a compendium of fifteen books. *Sutras* are one line Sanskrit phrases.

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- <sup>6</sup> Colonel Huang Shuofeng, *Zonghe Guoli Lun (On Comprehensive National Power)*, Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1992. pp. 155-159.
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- <sup>10</sup> The figure is a diagrammatic representation by the author.
- <sup>11</sup> Diagram conceptualized by the author.
- <sup>12</sup> Michael Liebig, "Statecraft and Intelligence Analysis in the Kautilya-Arthashastra", *Journal of Defence Studies*, 8(4), October-December 2014 edition. pp. 27-54. [http://idsa.in/jds/8\\_4\\_2014StatecraftandIntelligenceAnalysis.html](http://idsa.in/jds/8_4_2014StatecraftandIntelligenceAnalysis.html)
- <sup>13</sup> LN Rangarajan, *"Kautilya Arthashastra"*, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1992 edition. pp. 559.
- <sup>14</sup> KA 6:1.96.
- <sup>15</sup> RP Kangle, *"The Kautilya Arthashastra, Part II"*, New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, Bombay: University of Bombay Publications, 1972 edition. pp. 385-405.
- <sup>16</sup> LN Rangarajan, Op. Cit., pp.124. (KA 8:1.12-18).
- <sup>17</sup> R P Kangle, op.cit (figure has been conceptualised by the author).
- <sup>18</sup> KA 7:18.44. Kangle, Op. Cit., pp. 384.
- <sup>19</sup> LN Rangarajan, Op. Cit., pp. 563.
- <sup>20</sup> Michael Liebig, Op. Cit., pp. 49.
- <sup>21</sup> Figure conceptualized by the author.
- <sup>22</sup> KA 6:2.30-32. Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra*, Part II, pp. 319.

# Trade and Economic Sanctions - Effectiveness and Evil of Sanctions

Major General KK Pant®

## Introduction

Globalisation has opened new dimensions in conflict resolution as trade and economic interests guide the same and their use of sanction being applied as tools of State Policy. It is a well known fact that economic sanctions have been frequently used in last few decades, both multilaterally by the United Nations and unilaterally by the United States.<sup>1</sup> Yet, the knowledge about the efficacy and implications of trade and economic sanctions remains inadequate. This results in errors when assessing the utility of sanctions as an option in general and in the misapplication of sanctions in most cases. Sanctions that are haphazardly applied will not necessarily induce policy changes in the desired direction. Sanctions offer a middle course 'between words and wars.'<sup>2</sup> Sanctions could be resorted to under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter when considered by the Security Council to be absolutely necessary. The objectives of any sanction including trade and economic sanctions are as follows:-

- (a) Deterrence.
- (b) Restoration.
- (c) Rehabilitation.
- (d) Prevention.
- (e) Institutional Reconstruction.
- (f) Individual Reconstruction.

Economic sanctions are often used in times of war in the form of economic blockades and embargoes. Here they are, however, secondary to military measures. There is a fundamental difference between sanctions employed during wartime with the aim of destroying the infrastructure of the offending State, and

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sanctions employed as a method of “non-destructive coercion” with the objective of law enforcement. There are important differences in the status and purpose of economic measures used as techniques of warfare either in conjunction with military measures or independently and economic sanctions employed by an international organisation as part of a constitutionally authorised enforcement process.

Chapter VII of the UN Charter confers upon the Security Council the competence to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”, as also the power to decide upon the measures needed to “maintain or restore international peace and security.” If satisfied the Security Council may initiate economic action against the offending state under Article 41. Such action may “include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and/or rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations”.<sup>3</sup>

### **Range of Measures**

The range of measures that can be adopted by the sanctioning state are as follows:-

- (a) The management of access to a flow of goods, services and money, as well as to markets, with the end of denying the target State such access while maintaining it for oneself.
- (b) The blocking or freezing of the target assets.
- (c) The imposing of import and export embargoes, total or selective.
- (d) Blacklisting of foreign firms and individuals who deal with the target State.
- (e) Drying up of foreign supplies by preclusive buying.
- (f) Control of re-exportation from a non-participant territory.
- (g) Control of shipping through selective admission to credit, insurance, stores, fuels, port and repair facilities.
- (h) The monetary system of the target State may be substantially impaired by skillful manipulation of foreign exchange markets.
- (i) Withdrawal or refusal of credits.

**Rationale**

The assumption behind the classical theory of sanctions is that economic deprivation of that country affects the population for basic needs. It causes political instability or becomes a cause of concern for the regime. It will result in either political change or acceding to demand for which sanction has been enforced. The precise manner in which economic sanctions would cause hardship has been variously interpreted. It is, however, generally agreed that income levels go down by and large and real income suffers a decline, thus shortage of foreign exchange makes curbs on crucial imports inevitable, and that the loss of foreign markets leads to deterioration in the balance of payments position. The modern State is not a self-sufficient economic unit; the development of international trade and commerce has made it an integral part of the world economy. Economic isolation can very well undermine the economic structures of the target State. Therefore, sanctions will succeed if:-

- (a) The imports of the target State have a very high loading effect on important sectors.
- (b) There is no internal substitute for the imports.
- (c) A high percentage of the important imports come from the sending nations applying sanctions.
- (d) There is no external substitute for these imports so that the target cannot change its trade partners.
- (e) The imports make up a very small part of the exports of the sending nation(s), and/or that they can form alternative trade relationships.
- (f) The exports of the target are sent mainly to the states applying sanctions and that it cannot find new markets easily.

A comprehensive sanctions regime, indeed any regime of sanctions that is capable of affecting the civilian population, must provide for "humanitarian exceptions". This is necessary whether the sanctions are imposed by a State or by the Security Council. Some of the exceptions are enumerated as follows:-

- (a) The prohibition on starvation of the civilian population.
- (b) The right to humanitarian assistance.

- (c) Relief supplies in naval blockades.
- (d) Relief supplies for occupied territories.

### **Case Study Iraq**

The United Nations Security Council has maintained comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq since August 6, 1990 under Resolution 661, stayed largely in force until May 2003 and persisted in part including reparations to Kuwait through the present.<sup>4</sup> Many policy makers saw these economic sanctions as an ethical and non-violent policy tool.<sup>5</sup> Though Iraq sanctions produced some significant disarmament results, they failed to achieve all their policy goals and they have deeply harmed powerless and vulnerable Iraqi citizens and were criticised for their harmful humanitarian impacts.<sup>6</sup> They were only successful in achieving Iraq's disarmament by pressuring the regime to accept grudgingly the UN weapons monitoring mandate.<sup>7</sup>

**Civilian Suffering.** There is a clear consensus that the humanitarian and developmental situation in Iraq has deteriorated seriously since the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions whilst, at the same time, sanctions have clearly failed to hurt those responsible for past violations of International Law as Saddam Hussein and his ruling elite continued to enjoy a privileged existence till Op Enduring Freedom.

**Oil-for-Food.** In the mid-1990s, as political support for Iraq sanctions declined, the Security Council proposed that Iraq export oil on a controlled basis and use the revenues, under UN supervision, to buy humanitarian supplies. The Council passed Resolution 986 as a "temporary" measure on April 12, 1995, with a restrictive cap on oil sales. The government of Iraq reluctantly agreed to the Council's conditions a year later. Though Oil-for-Food brought undoubted short-term benefits to a desperate population, it never eliminated the humanitarian crisis. Contrary to common perception, the Oil-for-Food program is not "humanitarian aid." No foreign government or NGO donates food, medicines or other necessities to Iraq under the programme.

**Blocked Contracts, Holds and Dual-Use.** In the period before Oil-for-Food, the Iraq Sanctions Committee reviewed proposed import contracts to determine whether they should be exempted from the import ban under Resolution 687. Food and

medicines considered strictly humanitarian most readily won approval, but even in this humanitarian area the Committee blocked contracts when a single delegation objected.

### **Analysis of Sanctions in Indian Context**

On May 11, 1998, India detonated three nuclear devices. Two days later, India announced the tests of two more devices. On May 13, USA imposed sanctions which could be summarised as follows:-

- (a) Terminates assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;
- (b) Terminates sales of defence articles, defence services and arms and munitions;
- (c) Terminates Foreign Military Financing;
- (d) Denies credit and credit guarantees by US Government;
- (e) Announces US opposition to any loans or financial assistance by International Financial Institutions;
- (f) Prohibits US banks from making loans or extending credit to the government of India; and
- (g) Prohibits export of certain goods and technology subject to export licensing.

The United States was not alone. Japan, Germany, Canada, Australia, Sweden, and Denmark also imposed sanctions. The effect of the US sanctions was that on May 14, the rupee dropped to a record low.

### **Inefficacy of Sanctions on India**

The sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies had a negligible effect on the Indian economy and were in fact counterproductive to the American business interests.<sup>8</sup> Sanctions were not substantial enough to pressurise New Delhi into making major concessions on proliferation issues, and Washington did not consider increasing the magnitude of sanctions to achieve its non-proliferation goals. Instead, sanctions were maintained to signal the international community's disapproval of India and Pakistan's nuclear tests, but were selectively lifted over the course of their

first year. Numerous factors were responsible for the inefficacy of sanctions on India and their eventual lifting by United States. These factors could be summarised as follows:-

- (a) Changing geopolitical equations.
- (b) Globalisation.
- (c) Population and market size of India.
- (d) Trade with the USA.
- (e) Technological resources.
- (f) Forex reserve available with the Indian Government.

### **Economic Sanctions against North Korea – Total Ineffectiveness**

The United Nations Security Council approved a new regimen of sanctions in Mar 2013 against North Korea for its underground nuclear test in a unanimous vote.<sup>9</sup> The tougher sanctions imposed penalties on North Korea's banking, travel and trade and were passed in a 15-0 vote that reflected the country's increased international isolation. Even China, North Korea's longtime benefactor, voted for it and was taken as a sign of Beijing's growing annoyance with Pyongyang's defiant behaviour on the nuclear issue.

The United States and other major actors have long opted for economic sanctions to destabilise North Korea's authoritarian regime and end its nuclear programme. Over the years, though sanctions have inflicted major economic damage and isolated North Korea from the global economy, but they have failed to change the course of the Kim regime's stability and nuclear programme. Sanctions have been ineffective primarily for two reasons :-<sup>10</sup>

- (a) Pyongyang has been able to shield its ruling circle from the economic costs of sanctions, and has employed means of repression to quell dissent and domestic opposition.
- (b) The targeted North Korean regimes surviving external pressure by diverting the economic costs of sanctions to ordinary citizens and using the remaining resources to offer selective rewards to their supporters to isolate them from the economic hardship. Selective rewards in turn preempt defections from the ruling circles.

### **Suggestions**

Economic aggression has been waged on States as diverse as Cuba, Iran, Myanmar, South Africa, Serbia, Libya and Syria. In almost all cases, they were counterproductive, internally strengthening the deplored regime and its policy. In Iraq, Serbia and Libya their failure was an incitement to violence and war. Economic and trade sanctions impoverish the poor, militarise the State and cripple the mercantile middle class from which opposition to a regime might arise.

While a weapon can devastate an entire neighbourhood in a moment, the slow death of economic strangulation can so degrade an entire population that they are reduced to a pre-civilisation state.<sup>11</sup> The change in the nature of threat to the international peace and security environment has thrown open numerous contradictions, problems and varied approaches to conflict resolution. Economic sanctions have become an important instrument for expressing disapproval of certain proscribed acts of nations, such as cross-border aggression and gross violations of human rights. Most developed nations consider economic sanctions as 'a peaceful, silent and deadly remedy'.<sup>12</sup> Sanctions are perceived as milder than going to war, but more stringent than mere diplomatic protests or the withdrawal of ambassadors. Some Human Rights Organisations have labelled economic and trade sanctions as acts of war, because of their effects on the common man. Although end of apartheid in South Africa due to sanctions was a mile stone but there are basic ethical objections to the use of sanctions in general cases. Sanctions are a form of punishment and there are four preconditions that would make punishment morally acceptable:-

- (a) There must be a legitimate authority to administer sanctions.
- (b) The guilty rather than the innocent should be punished.
- (c) Individuals rather than masses should be punished.
- (d) All offenders must be treated equally.

Sanctions, as presently practiced do not fulfill any of above mentioned preconditions. Among alternatives to sanctions, "targeted sanctions", which would be directed against the leadership, not the people would be more prudent and effective in today's scenario.

The most significant of the major recommendations for institutionalising these reforms are as given below:-

- (a) Promote greater transparency and more effective communications, to inform member states and the public about sanctions requirements and purposes.
- (b) Develop improved guidelines and standardised reporting procedures to assist member states in the implementation of sanctions.
- (c) Clarify the conditions that must be met for sanctions to be lifted, and consider easing sanctions partially in response to partial compliance by targeted regimes.
- (d) Standardise and improve procedures for providing humanitarian exemptions and assistance.
- (e) Utilize expert panels and monitoring mechanisms for the investigation of sanctions compliance.
- (f) Take action against those who are found to be deliberately violating sanctions (the expert panel reports recommended imposing sanctions against such violators).
- (g) Provide technical assistance and expert advice to states needing help in the implementation of sanctions.
- (h) Conduct periodic assessments of humanitarian impact, third party effects, and the progress of implementation efforts.

In conclusion, resorting to economic sanctions now appears to be an established part of the international community's response to situations involving violence or a risk of violence. Such sanctions are legal in terms of International Law, provided they comply with applicable rules of human rights and International Humanitarian Law. This means that sanctions regimes must be crafted in such a way that they do not endanger the lives or health of the population of the target State. They must provide for humanitarian exceptions to limit the suffering caused to the civilian population and to comply with Human Rights and International Humanitarian Laws. Furthermore, sanctions regimes must be monitored, throughout their duration, to ensure that they do not cause undue suffering to the population of the target State and that the exemption mechanisms permit the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

## Endnotes

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<sup>3</sup> Thomas G Weiss Samdaws ed., *The Oxford handbook on the United Nation*, 2007, pp 347.

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<sup>5</sup> Paul Conlon, *UN Sanction Management: A case Study of the Iraq Sanctions Committee, 1990-1994* (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publisher 2000).

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<sup>8</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Porkhran-II>.

<sup>9</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanctions\\_against\\_North\\_Korea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanctions_against_North_Korea).

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# Is UN Security Council Seat Worth the Effort?

Dr S Krishnan<sup>®</sup>

## Introduction

For almost a decade, there have been talks on restructuring of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and last year United Nations (UN) members agreed that they will negotiate the wording of a document to reform the Security Council and submitted written suggestions for the same. It also caught fire when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a strong contention for a permanent seat for India in UNSC.

Current permanent members of the UNSC – the US, Russia, France, the UK and China – were the victors and superpowers of Second World War (WW II). France and Republic of China (ROC) were the allies of the WW II and there were various other reasons that afforded them seats in UNSC. The defeated nations were excluded from this power structure.

Systematic failure of the UNSC in functioning and achieving its objective of securing peace and resolving conflict, such as, the misuse of UNSC resolutions by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to bomb Libya, and the failure to end civil war in Syria etc. do pose a need for reformation. Veto has often been used by the US, Russia and China in pursuit of their own geopolitical interests and that of their allies. East-West rivalries have paralysed UNSC in realising its purpose. There has been no reform in the UNSC membership as well as its working for the last 50 years and there is an urgent need for the same.

Recent talks of reforms in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) have again given rise to India's ambition to get itself placed as one of the permanent members of the UNSC.

## Background

India's first chance for a permanent seat came in 1950s when

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both the US and the then USSR supported replacement of China with India as permanent member of the UNSC, which was rejected by then Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, on the belief that replacing China would have made it a permanent enemy of India. Support for India's quest in becoming a permanent member has necessarily to come from every incumbent permanent member, unless we see a total reformation in the UN Charter. The US, the UK and France have backed India in getting a permanent seat on various occasions, including recently in the 70th session of the UNGA in New York.

India is primarily a regional power attempting to define itself in terms of global power by maintaining the relationship with other major powers like the US, China, Russia and European Union. For most part of the 20th Century, India's relations with the rest of Asia were limited but it changed with India's rising ambitions. India increased its trade within Asia by altering the economic dynamics gradually and tried to translate them into new political realities. Japan has replaced China as the dominant economic power while China has become the dominant continental power and is important for an overall stability in Asia.

According to SK Ghosh, *"This dream is pre-dated even the transfer of power from the British."*<sup>1</sup> In October 1946, when India was still a British colony, Nehru had the same views. While addressing the army officers, he said, *"India is today among the four great powers of the world: other three being America, Russia, and China. But in point of resources, India has greater potential than China". He added that "India is likely to dominate politically and economically, the Indian Ocean region"*.<sup>2</sup>

India is the largest democracy of the world with over 1 billion population. India's strategic position in Asia has always played a crucial role in its history. India's role in strengthening UN's position has always been positive. Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State of the US, noted that the international system in 21st century would be dominated by six nuclear powers, the US, China, Russia, Europe, Japan and probably India.<sup>3</sup> Samuel P Huntington also shared this idea and wrote that during coming decade, *"India could move into rapid economic development and emerge as a major contender for influence in world affairs"*. He included India in eight civilisations of the world.<sup>4</sup>

India's significant role in peacekeeping all over the world is well known. It has been instrumental in eradicating apartheid, slavery and has helped decolonise many Asian and African countries. India has always supported the weak, suffering and oppressed humanity.

### **Post-Cold War Era**

In the post-Cold War era, India extended its support for the expansion of UNSC and demanded for important adjustments with a permanent seat for itself in the Security Council. Its more emphasis is on the pragmatic aspects of multilateralism. India rested its claim on its track record of multilateralism as it has contributed in 41 out of 59 UN peacemaking operations and 11 out of 15 peacekeeping operations. India has been a major troop contributing country. In 1998, it became the largest troop contributor. It is a well known fact that Indian forces as the UN peace keepers have performed a wonderful job in many countries including Korea, Somalia, and Angola etc., and there was also a great demand that Indian troops should be sent to Iraq to establish and maintain peace there. Currently, India has over 7800 personnel deployed in UN-led peace operations and is a champion of the Group of 77 comprising a large number of the developing countries.<sup>5</sup> These affiliations have made India as one of the largest troop contributors to the UN.

### **Legitimacy for India's Bid**

Legitimacy for India's bid for a permanent seat in the UNSC came first from the US President Barrack Obama who announced it in his speech to the Indian Parliament during his first visit to India in November 2010.<sup>6</sup> Nations that have traditionally given a cold shoulder to India's global ambitions, such as the UAE and Syria, were quick to jump on to the bandwagon and extend support for the same. Even arch-rival China said that it understood and supported India's desire to play a greater role in the UN.

There are differences as well as common interests between the US and India in their current relations. This relationship rests on several pillars. One common interest is the convergence of fundamental values such as democracy and rule of law. The other is the driving force behind the rapprochement as *realpolitik*. The vivid expression of this was the Indo-US nuclear deal in 2006 for

the transfer of nuclear technology. The deal is the US's recognition of India's new geopolitical significance and bridging the chasm of the Cold War. US-India nuclear deal took years to materialise, much due to the India's hesitation in accepting American conditions. This reflects an Indian view point of limited partnership rather than an alliance with the US. Both countries recognise the importance of new partnership. For India, it provides leverage against China and confirmation as a major power in future. The strategic interests of the two countries are increasingly congruent in different areas including terrorism and proliferation.

But nowhere is the importance of Game Theory and the principle that 'for everything you gain at the negotiating table, you have to give something back' more evident than in diplomatic dealings – a fact that India seems to have overlooked.

Next came the visit of President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, who arrived in India on 03 Dec 2010, and was successful in selling the still-untested Areva nuclear reactors to India at a cost of US \$22 billion.<sup>7</sup> The project has been plagued by financial overruns and delays in the other locations where it is being built, and Areva has been criticised for grossly under-estimating the cost of producing a single unit of electricity. Given the severe energy crisis in India and the importance of reducing the country's reliance on fossil fuels, nuclear energy is indeed the answer. But buying an untested nuclear reactor in return for a statement of support is too great a risk to take – and too great a concession to make.

India's trade-offs for the UNSC seat didn't stop there. Having set the mood very carefully on the first day of his Dec 15-17 visit to India by supporting India's aspiration of a greater role in the UN, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, had very skillfully skirted the issues of disputed borders with India, stapled visas for Kashmiris and Arunachalis and control of Arunachal and Tibet. In the end, the Chinese Premier's statement didn't amount to unequivocal support for India's bid for a permanent seat – only India's greater participation. Buoyed by this apparent diplomatic victory, Indian officials went about inking US \$16 billion in economic deals with China.

As the so-called BRIC countries i.e. Brazil, Russia, India, and China, have grown more and more influential in the world

economy, their administrators and myriad pundits have inevitably concluded that they and other rising powers should also become more important actors in global politics. The insistence by Brazil and India for permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council, a similar push by China and Brazil for a greater say on climate change talks and on IMF and World Bank voting shares, and a greater voice for South Africa in all of these arenas are just a few examples of the BRICs' growing boldness.

The emerging powers are not ready for prime role as yet. And never has this been clearer than now, with revolution sweeping the Middle East. It is the traditional powers in the West that will determine the international response to this crisis — not because they are favored by global institutions, but because their word is backed by military and diplomatic weight. In contrast, the world's rising economies lack the ability - and the values - to project their power on the world stage.

Let's back up a bit. By now, the growing economic clout of the new regional powers is indisputable. Their political strength, however, is less obvious. More importantly, their entry into the halls of world governance would not necessarily strengthen the developing international legal regime. These new powers lack the same commitment as the older ones to supranational institutions and universal values such as human rights, the collective defence of democracy, a robust climate change framework, nuclear nonproliferation, and so forth. Hence, permanent seats on the Security Council for Brazil, India and South Africa, coupled with greater participation by China, Pakistan, Indonesia, and even Mexico in international agencies or bodies, might weaken the very foundations of the liberal democratic order — although in this regard, their entrance would also make international bodies more globally representative.

### **Reasons for India to be Permanent Member of the UNSC**

What if India does go on to become permanent member of UNSC, serving as an independent entity rather than being guided by the Big Five existing members? What would India achieve?

The question of India's influence in the Security Council addresses the issue at the core of Security Council effectiveness, namely its influence in the international arena especially in

maintaining international peace and security. India still would have immense influence on a veto-less Council. Having had consistently good relations with Russia, India will have considerable influence over Russian positions. The need to include India now is also intensified by the fact that China is soon likely to be the second new superpower in the world. Therefore, India would act as a counterweight to China that would give it significant influence with the US, the EU and China's neighbours, including Japan. Finally, India would still be the most influential Third World State.

India believes its permanent membership of the Council would moderate the arbitrariness of the present permanent members in decision-making matters, particularly to do with international peace and security. Indeed, India wants to be involved in the steering and have a say in these matters. India is keen to see an empowered UN that can take on the world policeman role, which some feel seems to have been usurped by the US unilateralism at the present time.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, India sees itself as the champion of the developing world and is keen to establish development as central to the UN's agenda.<sup>9</sup> Mr Kofi Annan has been quoted as saying that India's has been one of the most eloquent voices helping shape the UN agenda on behalf of the developing world.<sup>10</sup>

India's UNSC reform strategy has two main components. Garnering support in the UN General Assembly and reducing resistance in the UN Security Council. Through India's continued leadership in the G77, it hopes to assure widespread support in the UN General Assembly. India's strong stance on defending sovereignty and criticising "the responsibility to protect" can be understood in this context. At the same time, India's recent rapprochement with China, its historic nuclear deal with the United States, and its continued historic friendship with Russia are all meant to assure that none of the permanent members would block India's entry.

India seeks to alter some of the UNSC's rules and decision-making procedures, but adheres to its principles, ultimately strengthening the UNSC. Its strategy is therefore not merely "revisionist", as is often claimed,<sup>11</sup> but it constitutes revisionist integration. The fact that India is one of the few member states that has been elected six times to the body underlines the importance of the entity for the Indian Government.<sup>12</sup> The Indian Government bemoans that governance structures, particularly in the UNSC,

have not been able to keep up with contemporary realities. Indian politicians believe that India should have been granted a permanent seat on the UNSC in 1945.<sup>13</sup> After failing to obtain a seat in 2005, when India was part of the G-4 (together with Germany, Japan and Brazil), the Indian Government is determined to continuously push for expanding the Council, even though short-term success is unlikely. China is seen as a crucial gate keeper in India's attempt to advance in the UN Security Council, and this together with an appreciation of China's growing economic importance is one of the reasons that India aims to improve relations with China, despite an ongoing border dispute in Arunachal Pradesh.

The US, China and Russia did not contribute to the text, a move which was seen as an attempt to thwart India's bid for permanent membership of the global body. Though the US and Russia have been supporting India's bid, China has been against any expansion of the Security Council. Besides the above permanent members that oppose the G-4 contention, a group called the Uniting for Consensus (UFC), comprising 13 countries like, Pakistan, Italy, South Korea, and Colombia, etc have been opposing the move. The UFC demands a 25-member Security Council with more non-permanent members instead of a few more permanent members.

Another question that remains unanswered is that whether new members in the Security Council would be given the veto at all, which the US and Russia have made very clear they would not favour.

### **Global Reality of World Politics**

In 2010, India managed to earn clear support from the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, the United States and Russia for a place in the UNSC, so now it enjoys the backing of four out of the five current permanent members of the UNSC. More ambivalent on the matter is China – a traditional rival to India in Asia and a close partner of Pakistan, which would prefer to maintain the status quo. Also, the support of other permanent members is rather declaratory in nature since none has pushed vigorously for UNSC reform. A majority of countries, including Poland, look favourably on India's aspirations in the United Nations, but also link their support for India to general reform of the UN.

So, it's worth asking: as a permanent member of the UNSC, would India gain any advantages other than the exercise of Veto? Some would argue that a permanent seat would give India leverage with other nations outside the Security Council, which might ask for India's help in lobbying within it.

This is hardly a compelling argument, for two reasons. Firstly, the UN's relevance in dealing with conflicts has been undermined by the US attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq. Second, nations are more likely to spend their efforts lobbying the most influential members of the Council rather than its newest members.

Currently, India's interests are being served well by Russia in the Security Council. India need not make a permanent seat its top policy goal while that friendship remains solid and without cracks. The country might be better served by exploiting the rapid pace of economic growth to negotiate technology transfer and canvas support for bilateral issues. It's an approach that is unlikely to achieve short-term glory, but will ultimately serve the country better in the medium and long term.

Despite China's and Brazil's military and naval buildup, and India's and Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons, they still lack the ability to project power the way countries such as France and Britain can when NATO or the UN Security Council so decides. One can agree with such interventions or oppose them, but at this juncture only countries such as these and the United States have the wherewithal to actually do something in crises such as Libya.

The main obstacles on the way to India's permanent membership on the UNSC are its unresolved dispute in Kashmir, opposition from Pakistan and some allegations of human rights violations. Also, problematic is that India is still outside the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime; although the significance of this argument has considerably declined after it signed a nuclear deal with the United States, which de facto recognised India as a nuclear state. For India, support for its bid for a permanent UNSC seat is a highly important issue and is treated as a litmus test for bilateral cooperation. But the realisation of Indian aspirations is connected with the structural reform of the whole UN system, which is not in sight.

## Conclusion

For India, the chances of getting into the permanent membership of the UN Security Council are very high; but the chances of getting veto power are highly doubtful. Ideally one loves to have such a power, but a permanent position in the Security Council even without a veto is not a bad idea. A Security Council seat even without a veto can definitely change the course of India's destiny drastically. India, in the first instance, should accept a berth on the Security Council and then lobby hard to achieve equal status in the Council with the permanent five veto-wielding nations.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Chapman, Graham P., *The Geo-Politics of South Asia from Early Empires to the Nuclear Age*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, London, 2003, pp.12-14.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, p.28.

<sup>3</sup> Kissinger, Henry, *Diplomacy*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994, pp.23-24.

<sup>4</sup> Huntington, Samuel P, *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996, p.121

<sup>5</sup> "India and the Future Global Order", Department for Security Policy, Norwegian Ministry of Defense, Norway, November 2009. Retrieved from india-studie\_ssek\_301109.pdf.

<sup>6</sup> "Obama backs India on permanent UN Security Council seat", BBC News, 8<sup>th</sup> November, 2010.

<sup>7</sup> Naravane, Vaiju, "India Racing to buy an untried sector?", The Hindu, 5<sup>th</sup> December, 2010.

<sup>8</sup> Ben Freeman, 'Preventing Future Iraqs' (draft).

<sup>9</sup> UN Reform Process. Available at [http://www.un.int/india/india\\_and\\_the\\_un\\_unreform.html](http://www.un.int/india/india_and_the_un_unreform.html). Accessed on 18 Jan 2017.

<sup>10</sup> "Annan's praise boosts India's UN ambition", The Hindustan Times, 29<sup>th</sup> April, 2005.

<sup>11</sup> See, for example, "Our size, our potential strength, our traditions and heritage do not allow us to become a client state." Paul, T.V. and Hall, John A., *International Order and the Future of World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

<sup>12</sup> Nafey, Abdul, "India and the G8: Reaching out or out of reach?" in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz, *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, 2008.

<sup>13</sup> Sud, H, "Commentary: India and the UN Security Council", UPI Asia, 11<sup>th</sup> September, 2007. Available at [http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2007/09/11/commentary\\_india\\_and\\_the\\_un\\_security\\_council/1443/](http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2007/09/11/commentary_india_and_the_un_security_council/1443/). Accessed on 18 Jan 2017.

# A Call to Remember

**Mingma Lhamu Pakhrin and Bhanushali Gahlot®**

India has witnessed the remarkable service and sacrifice of her men and women in various military operations since 1914. Yet, the significance of the role and contribution of the Indian Armed Forces' personnel has failed to find its place into the mainstream narratives of our culture. The commemorations held in the country are largely military-service based and, therefore, are not inclusive of the wider communities. Furthermore, the existence of multiple dates to remember and commemorate various military achievements fails to engage Indian civil society in a holistic commemoration.<sup>1</sup>

Many countries around the world have designated special days and symbols to honour the valour and sacrifice of their service personnel. The “Poppy” is recognised in the United Kingdom and many Commonwealth countries as a symbol of remembrance. Likewise, the date of the Armistice, which marked the end of the First World War -11<sup>th</sup> November – is observed in many countries as ‘Remembrance Day’. There is a strong need for India to similarly institutionalise a ‘Day of Remembrance’, which could help foster a culture of remembrance.

This article attempts to address the various reasons which have led to a lack of culture of remembrance in the country. By highlighting the contribution of the Indian Armed Forces, it sheds light on the recent efforts made to sensitise and enable the Indian communities to honour and commemorate the Indian servicemen and women.

The first half of the twentieth century marked a watershed in Indian history, both in the national as well as the global context. The first four decades of the century witnessed rapid development of the struggle for freedom from colonial rule on the home front and outbreak of the two World Wars on the global front. In an attempt to gain greater political autonomy, India decided to support the British Empire in its hour of need and joined the First World War

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as a colony in the Empire.<sup>2</sup> The immense Indian military contribution in the two World Wars is evident from the fact that over three million servicemen and women from 'undivided India'<sup>3</sup> served in these wars, suffering more than 160,000 casualties.<sup>4</sup>

The national movement for freedom culminated in 1947 with the attainment of Independence from the colonial yoke and the birth of two nations. Within just two months of gaining Independence, India was faced with its first external threat from the newly created Pakistan over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Since Independence, the Indian Armed Forces have been in four major wars with Pakistan; in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999 along with many border skirmishes and military stand-offs; and with China in 1962. The Indian Armed Forces have also participated under the banner of Indian Peace Keeping Force (Sri Lanka and Maldives) and peacekeeping missions around the globe under the banner of the United Nations.<sup>5</sup> Over 22,000 military personnel have lost their lives in the post-Independence military operations. On one hand, the numbers of Indian war dead since the First World War continue to add up with each passing year, on the other, they go largely unnoticed and escape the consciousness of the masses – such is the anomaly prevalent in India.

The lack of awareness of the sacrifice made by the Indian Armed Forces among the Indian masses and their failure to acknowledge this has undermined the contribution of the military personnel. In the recent years, their sacrifices have been reduced to a short-term media coverage accompanied by momentary public outcry, which is forgotten as soon as the next 'media event' occurs. However, such momentary outcries and media coverage have proved to be ineffective in preserving and resuscitating the memory of the fallen Indian soldiers in the minds of the people.

Recently, with the commemoration of hundred years of First World War (2014-18), individual and collective efforts of research scholars and institutions have been instrumental in highlighting the often-sidelined contribution of India in the First World War. The efforts made by the United Service Institution of India – Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (USI-CAFHR) through the joint USI- Ministry of External Affairs 'India and the Great War' centenary commemoration project since 2014 has been vital in changing the

official and public perception of India's role in a war that changed the course of modern world history, both in India and abroad.<sup>6</sup> It has also played a key role in widening the scope for academic intervention into the subject. Moreover, the recognition provided by the Government of India and the Indian Armed Forces has helped generate awareness amongst various sections of the Indian society and the Indian diaspora.<sup>7</sup> This is evident from the remarks made by the Prime Minister of India referring to the shared history of the First World War in joint statements with partner countries (such as Australia, France and New Zealand).<sup>8</sup>

Furthermore, the USI-CAFHR launched 'India Remembers' pilot project in partnership with the Commonwealth War Graves Commission,<sup>9</sup> Flags of Honour Foundation<sup>10</sup> and Big Ideas Company<sup>11</sup> on 14<sup>th</sup> July 2016, a date that marked the centenary of the first major Indian cavalry charge on the Somme during the First World War. The project intends to raise awareness of the role of the Indian Armed Forces' personnel who served and died in various military operations, before and after Independence, and to encourage Indian communities to honour and remember their sacrifice by undertaking commemorative activities such as visiting war memorials and museums, interacting with veterans, debates, creating art, etc. The pilot project came to a close on 07 Dec 2016, a day which is annually observed as the Armed Forces Flag Day. The project's close engagement with diverse community groups from across India brought out three fundamental factors responsible for the apathy among communities to remember, honour and commemorate the Indian Armed Forces' personnel.<sup>12</sup> First, the lack of awareness about India's military contribution over the last century; second, lack of accessible war memorials and a National War Memorial; and lastly, an absence of a 'Remembrance Day' and a symbol/culture of remembrance in India.

While many members of the community groups had basic understanding of the Indian Armed Forces' role in the post-Independence military operations, their knowledge pertaining to India's contribution in the two World Wars was insignificant. This general lack of sufficient knowledge to some extent has resulted from failure of elementary educational institutions to include the military aspects of Indian history into their curriculum and complexity and difference in the narratives of the twentieth century modern

Indian history, which has led to the emergence of 'historical amnesia'.<sup>13</sup>

War memorials play an important role in any society, reminding us and the future generations of the sacrifice made by servicemen and women in the line of duty. In India, there are three kinds of war memorials; firstly, war memorials that commemorate the sacrifice of men of undivided India who served and died in the two World Wars, most of which are maintained by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission; secondly, post-Independence war memorials constructed with the Government's sanction within military cantonments and stations; and thirdly, war memorials constructed by the State Governments and civic bodies.<sup>14</sup>

Despite their existence in large numbers across the length and the breadth of the country, war memorials have failed to evoke a sense of remembrance among communities and engage them in acts of commemoration. They have become a symbol of reverence for concerned few – war veterans, retired service personnel, descendants of fallen soldiers, etc. The development of these paradoxes of war memorials in India may have been caused by the lack of awareness and acknowledgement among Indian masses with regards to India's contribution in the two World Wars, which has led to the negligence of the war memorials dedicated to undivided India's war dead. For instance, built in 1931, India Gate stands tall overlooking the capital city, New Delhi. It is visited by hundreds of tourists and locals each day; yet, it is a matter of lament that very few of them know its significance. Inaccessibility of locations of war memorials is another reason as most of them are built within the military cantonment and stations; and also the absence of a National War Memorial.

The need for a National War Memorial cannot be overemphasised. The proposal to build the country's first National War Memorial and National War Museum was approved by the Government of India in 2015. According to the proposal, while the memorial will be built in the vicinity of India Gate, the museum will be set up in the adjoining area of Princess Park. However, while it is called a National War Memorial, it will only commemorate the sacrifice of those personnel of the Indian Armed Forces who served and died in the post-Independence military operations,<sup>15</sup> thus making India Gate a *de facto* First World War memorial, leaving the country

with no memorial to commemorate the 2.5 million men who served in the Second World War.

David Omissi has rightly pointed out “the army often remains in the background, but the background is an important part of the picture”.<sup>16</sup> In India, there is an urgent need to bring to fore the role of the Indian Armed Forces since 1914 in the larger mainstream narrative and to engage communities in Indian military history discourse fostering a culture of remembrance. Furthermore, it is important to commemorate the contributions of Indian Armed Forces’ personnel holistically and apolitically, rather than viewing the same through the prism of the pre- and post-Independence military operations. Besides, the need for India to dedicate a specific day of remembrance and a symbol of remembrance which can allow citizens here, as well as the international diaspora, to acknowledge the valour and sacrifice of the Indian Armed Forces in the service of the nation over the last century remains equally strong.

The timely realisation of these issues led to the inception of ‘India Remembers’, a dynamic, creative and transformative community engagement project which proposes that a Day of Remembrance or *Sainik Smriti Divas* be instituted to commemorate the sacrifices of Indian Armed Forces’ personnel across the nation annually, and that the Marigold flower be adopted as a unique Indian symbol of remembrance.<sup>17</sup> While the proposal is under consideration of the Government, the India Remembers pilot project, which ran for a period of over five months (14<sup>th</sup> July- 7<sup>th</sup> December, 2016), was successful to a large extent in generating awareness about India’s role and contribution in military operations since 1914, and in encouraging the community groups to adopt the use of Marigold flower as a symbol of remembrance.

For a nation whose military strength is the fourth largest<sup>18</sup> in the world and whose “resolve may yet to be tested in conflicts to come”,<sup>19</sup> we are left with a responsibility to acknowledge and commemorate their valour and sacrifice which is long overdue. Therefore, the time is ripe for communities to come together and work towards developing a culture of remembrance in the country.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> 15 January observed as Army Day; 26 July observed as Kargil Vijay Divas; 8 October observed as Air Force Day; 4 December observed as Navy Day; 7 December observed as Armed Forces Flag Day; and 16 December observed as Victory day.

<sup>2</sup> Chhina, Rana, *India and the Great War*, New Delhi: USI-CAFHR, 2015, pp. 26.

<sup>3</sup> Undivided India here refers to the geographical territory of British India during the two World Wars, which extended to present Pakistan in the North-West and present Bangladesh and Myanmar in the East.

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.cwgc.org/news-events/news/2011/11/forever-india-website.aspx>, accessed on 5 March 2016.

<sup>5</sup> For the history of Indian Peacekeeping missions, see Nambiar, Satish, *For the Honour of India: A History of Indian Peacekeeping*, New Delhi: USI-CAFHR, 2009.

<sup>6</sup> To know more about the project, visit [www.indiaww1.in](http://www.indiaww1.in)

<sup>7</sup> The Indian Army had organised an exhibition from 10- 14 March 2015 to commemorate the contribution of Indian Soldiers in WW1 - <http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/army-to-commemorate-martyred-indian-soldiers-in-first-world-war-745208>

<sup>8</sup> Remarks by the President of India made in Belgium on 03 October 2013; the Vice President of India in New Delhi on 05 March 2014; Joint Statements following the Prime Minister's visits to Australia on 18 November 2014 (<http://www.narendramodi.in/joint-statement-during-prime-ministers-visit-to-australia-november-16-18-2014-6908>), in France on 11 April 2015 ([http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26297/IndiaFrance\\_Joint\\_Statement\\_on\\_the\\_occasion\\_of\\_the\\_State\\_Visit\\_of\\_President\\_Francois\\_Hollande\\_of\\_the\\_French\\_Republic\\_to\\_India\\_January\\_25\\_2016](http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26297/IndiaFrance_Joint_Statement_on_the_occasion_of_the_State_Visit_of_President_Francois_Hollande_of_the_French_Republic_to_India_January_25_2016)) and in New Zealand on 26 October 2016 ([http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27535/India\\_New\\_Zealand\\_Joint\\_Statement\\_during\\_visit\\_of\\_Prime\\_Minister\\_of\\_New\\_Zealand\\_to\\_India](http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27535/India_New_Zealand_Joint_Statement_during_visit_of_Prime_Minister_of_New_Zealand_to_India)).

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.cwgc.org/>

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.flagsofhonour.in/>

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.bigideascompany.org/>

<sup>12</sup> Community groups comprised of schools, universities, NGOs, housing colonies, rotary clubs, research groups, etc. Visit [www.indiaremembers.in](http://www.indiaremembers.in)

<sup>13</sup> Tharoor Shashi, *India Shastra: Reflections on the Nation in our Time*, New Delhi: Aleph Book Company, 2015, pp. 100.

<sup>14</sup> Chhina, Rana, *Last Post: Indian War Memorials Around the World*, New Delhi: USI-CAFHR, 2014, pp. 161.

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/cabinet-clears-rs-500-crore-for-war-memorial-museum-for-postindependence-martyrs/article7734542.ece> accessed on 5 March 2016.

<sup>16</sup> Omissi, *The Sepoy and The Raj*, pp. xx.

<sup>17</sup> In the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth countries, Poppy is universally recognised as a symbol of remembrance and 11<sup>th</sup> November is observed as the Remembrance Day.

<sup>18</sup> [http://www.idsa.in/jds/2\\_1\\_2008\\_NeedforHolisticRestructuringoftheIndianMilitary\\_VOberoio](http://www.idsa.in/jds/2_1_2008_NeedforHolisticRestructuringoftheIndianMilitary_VOberoio) accessed on 9 March 2017.

<sup>19</sup> Tharoor, *India Shastra*, pp. 100

## Short Reviews of Recent Books

**China Threat or Challenge?** Edited by Lt Gen JS Bajwa, PhD, (Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 2017), pp.361, ISBN: 978-81-7062-315-1

The book is a collection of 27 essays about China by a galaxy of experts who have spent many years studying China. The essays deal with almost all aspects of China as a nation state and its behaviour; and how it impacts globally and regionally.

China's rise has a degree of mystique attached to it and is viewed with some trepidation in various capitals of the world. The essays cover wide ranging subjects: PLA reforms and its future war fighting potential, regional security, forays into the Indian Ocean, neighbourhood challenges, territorial disputes including its claims in the East and the South China Seas, state of the economy and internal fissures, the Tibet issue, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor; and a host of other contemporary topics. Most of the essays have also analysed implications for India, wherever relevant.

Undoubtedly, the book provides a rich and multi-disciplinary fare to a scholar of Chinese affairs. However, at the end of it all one is still left wondering – whether China is a threat or a challenge as the title suggests; or perhaps both, depending upon how one views it. Perhaps, the Editor could have tried to encapsulate China's capabilities, strategic behaviour and likely scenarios in a concluding chapter to provide an overall sense on this very vital subject about which the whole world is concerned.

In a work of this nature where many experts have given their views on different aspects it is but natural that there would be some repetition and overlapping in the contents. However, that does not detract a discerning reader from the overall value of the book as the contents have been arranged in a very logical sequence.

Most of the essays follow a standard narrative depicting China as an unreasonable and assertive power, intent on securing its national interests by any means, including use of military power. India is invariably seen to occupy a high moral ground. It would be more pragmatic, if India was to consider itself an important player

whose actions would have a great impact on shaping the regional environment. This ought to be reflected in its policies.

*Major General PJS Sandhu (Retd)*

**'Les Hindous: The Indian Army on the Western Front 1914-1919'** by *Rana Chhina*, (New Delhi: USI Centre for Armed Forces Research, New Delhi, 2016), pp..148, Price Rs 2000.00, ISBN: 9789384695118

It must be remembered that although India sent its expeditionary forces to aid the British during World War I, it was on French soil that Indian soldiers landed and it was there that many of them fought and died.

The people of France were aware that the German juggernaut aimed at conquest of France and that they would be far outnumbered if aid did not come in time. It was in this context that they welcomed the arrival of the Indian soldiers with great warmth and enthusiasm as the photographs in this book so lucidly bring out.

Indian troops were ill-equipped in weapons and equipment to fight a war in Europe. As a case in point, they were in cotton uniforms in the face of a severe European winter. Their situation, all the more endeared them to the French people. The arrival of the Indian Corps was timely and providential, and it is widely acknowledged that they were mainly instrumental in stopping the German offensive in its bid to roll up the Allied defences, bypass Paris and head for the Channel ports in October-November 1914.

This book has been compiled as part of the joint USI-MEA 'India and the Great War' centenary commemoration project, that highlights the role played by Indian soldiers and aviators on the Western Front during World War I. It befittingly carries a Foreword by the President of India.

India's sterling contribution to the Great War subsequently laid the foundation for her representation on the international stage. Indian delegates represented India at the Paris Peace Conference and were signatories to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. The participation and conduct of Indian troops during World War I set

into motion a chain of events that led eventually to freedom from British rule.

This book touches upon the many facets of the Indian soldier's experience in Europe during World War I, and rare archival photographs bring to life the long forgotten circumstances in which Indian soldiers fought in foreign lands over a hundred years ago. The book is an excellent combination of text and photographs that tells a powerful story of India's French connection during the Great War.

*Major General Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd)*

**China Strides in Bhutan, Nepal, Myanmar : Options for India.**  
*By Subodh Kumar Shahi, (New Delhi, GB Books, 2017), pp..193,  
Price Rs 995.00, ISBN: 9789383930579.*

The book is a useful compilation of history, political and economic situation, foreign policy of Bhutan, Nepal and Myanmar; and the development of their relations with both China and India. In particular, it describes China's increasing influence in the three countries on the back of its economic and military muscle, and the implications and options for India.

It describes how geography and economics closely tie both Nepal and Bhutan to India. It outlines how the growing presence of their other neighbour, China, in the two countries is loosening the Indian embrace. It deals in detail with Bhutan's dilemma on how to proceed on settling its disputed borders with China and when and how to establish full-fledged diplomatic relations with it. It criticises Indian ham-handedness in dealing with Nepali sensitivities, which has helped increase China's influence in that country.

Myanmar is another important neighbour of both China and India. It is also geographically linked to ASEAN countries. The book contrasts China's increasing influence in these countries with the lack of substantive engagement by India. It describes the strategic importance of Myanmar in the context of India's security in the North-East and connectivity to South-East Asia. The book criticises the lack of effective implementation of projects by India in the three countries, which handicaps its ability to rise to the challenge from China.

The book provides useful set of references for scholars. However, it would have benefitted from better editing, fact-checking and more detailed maps. It also expresses certain debatable opinions but that is the author's prerogative. The book holds the reader's attention and is a useful addition to the literature on the subject.

*Shri Sanjay Singh, IFS (Retd)*

**The Peacock Feather.** By Sunil Kapoor and Sudhir Kapoor (Rupa Publications India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2017), pp..195, Price Rs 395.00, ISBN 978-81-291-4459-1

Nothing in the bio-data of the authors (monozygotic twins who are Tax Consultant and Chartered Accountant by profession) at the back of the book prepares the reader for a barrage of ten beautifully written stories based on real-life incidents. That the number-crunching minds could also write such fascinating tales of love, hope and emotions is a refreshing revelation.

The authors take the readers on a journey where one experiences myriad of emotions. While 'The Peacock Feather', a bittersweet love story brings a smile on the face; the depiction of extreme trauma of having lost one's family during the bloody riots of 1947 leaves the reader teary-eyed in 'Train to Wagah'. 'The Wambesi Throne' is a strange yet humorous story of a young American-educated King of Mwanga Tribe of Congo, who takes revenge from the Americans in his own discreet and amusing way for death of his father and tribesmen caused by illegal mining of Uranium in his land by the Americans. 'A Misplaced Draft' and 'A Deceitful Paramour' are two stories that depict the numerous societal and family pressures that dominate the personal lives and decisions of girls in India and how the women protagonists in these stories turn the tide in their favour with their grit and resolve.

Likewise, each of the ten stories, very subtly brings out various facets of human nature – good, bad and ugly that binds the reader to its pages as the authors enthrall us with their compelling narration, replete with twists and turns and many a time unexpected happy endings. It is a perfect book to pick up if one is planning to go on a vacation to be read on leisurely evenings with a cup of hot coffee.

*Major Sonali Gupta (Retd)*

**Battleground Chhamb: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1971.** By Major General AJS Sandhu (New Delhi; Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2017), p.. 372, Price Rs. 1395/- ISBN:9789350981504

Chhamb has been the core of Pakistan's attention in the Indo-Pak wars of 1947-48, 1965 and 1971 and without doubt will once again figure in the calculus of Pakistan's strategy, should we go to war with Pakistan again. Notwithstanding this repetition of military history, we have each time been found unprepared for Pakistan's repeated aggression in this sector in terms of ground, relative strength and time and space - all vital factors in a military appreciation that assesses enemy intentions and our own responses. This specifically proves that, 'the only lesson we learn from history, is that we do not learn from history'.

In 'Battleground Chhamb', the author walks us through the battle that was fought in 1971 when all factors were loaded against the General Officer Commanding 10 Infantry Division, Major General Jaswant Singh, whose mission was to retrieve the honour of the Division, because in the previous encounter, the Pakistan offensive succeeded in reaching within spitting distance of Akhnur, a strategic area located on the communication highway between Jammu and Poonch and close to Jammu itself.

Whereas intelligence has failed the Nation time and again and in every war, it is difficult to understand how 15 Corps failed to appreciate that Pakistan would once again attack in the Akhnur Sector in 1971, after her success in 1965. Instead, in the run up to the war, the task given by the Corps to the General Officer Commanding 10 Infantry Division was changed four times. The fourth change was given the evening before Pakistan attacked in the Chhamb Sector.

Despite these handicaps, the Division fought resolutely and with courage and managed to stop the enemy on the Manawar Tawi, but there was some loss of territory and story of how and why this happened has been clouded with doubt and innuendo that had not been cleared all these years.

It remained for Major General AJS Sandhu, the son of General Jaswant Singh, to clear the air with his deeply researched book that covers every possible angle of the battle, the events that led

up to it, and its aftermath; in an excellent narrative that tells us what really happened forty six years ago.

The book is easy to read and is very well referenced indicating the thoroughness with which the story of the battle has been researched. I found the book difficult to put down and am sure that readers will find it equally absorbing and interesting.

India has lost territory repeatedly in the Chhamb area in the 1947-48, 1965 and 1971 wars, thanks to the failure of the military heirarchy to give this area the importance that it deserves.

Will it happen again? Who knows? Perhaps, if those who matter read this account; the situation may hopefully change.

*Major General Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM*

## **Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter Ending Sept 2016**

During this period a total of 53 new books have been added. Details of the new book are available on USI Website.

### **Research Projects**

Members interested in undertaking research projects may submit research proposals to USI (CS3 / CAFHR). At present, six chairs have been instituted in CS3; namely, Field Marshal KM Cariappa Chair, Admiral RD Katari Chair, Air Marshal Subroto Mukherjee Chair, Prof DS Kothari DRDO Chair, Ministry of External Affairs Chair, Flying Officer Amandeep Singh Gill Chair and two Chairs in CAFHR namely; Maharana Pratap Chair and Chhatrapati Shivaji Chair. Copies of the Rules for Award of Fellowship Grants and Conduct of Research are available on the USI Website.

### **Rate Card – Advertisements in Journal**

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### **New USI Members**

During the period 01 Jan – Mar 2017, 43 registered as New Life Members ; 19 Ordinary Members renewed their membership and 05 registered as new Ordinary Members.

### **Course Members**

During the same period, 423 Officers registered for Course Membership.

## USI COUNCIL MEMBERS

**FOR 01 JAN 2017 – 31 DEC 2019**

The following officers, names listed in alphabetical order, have been elected to the USI Council for the period 01 Jan 2017 to 31 Dec 2019 :-

1	Lt Gen Anil Ahuja, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM, VSM** (Retd)
2	Lt Gen Vinod Bhatia, PVSM, AVSM, SM (Retd)
3	Air Mshl VK Bhatia, PVSM, AVSM, VrC** (Retd)
4	Maj Gen Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd)
5	Vice Adm Anil Chopra, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
6	Air Mshl SG Inamdar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
7	Lt Gen GS Katoch, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
8	Lt Gen Prakash Menon, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
9	Shri Asoke Mukerji, IFS (Retd)
10	Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
11	Air Mshl PK Roy, PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM (Retd)
12	Lt Gen AK Sahni, PVSM, UYSM, SM, VSM (Retd)
13	Vice Adm Shekhar Sinha, PVSM, AVSM, NM** (Retd)
14	Maj (Prof) RN Swarup (Retd)

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# USI

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## OUR ACTIVITIES

### Library and Reading Room

The library holds over 68,000 books, and journals, including some books of 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, on an astonishing variety of subjects. While the principal emphasis is on strategy and defence, there are a large number of works on different vistas of Indian life. There are memoirs, biographies, recollections, diaries, journals, manuscripts for scholars and researchers. The reading room is air-conditioned, spacious and well stocked in terms of current reading material. Library was automated in 2002.

### Correspondence Courses

The Institution runs regular correspondence courses for officers of the Armed Forces to assist them in preparing for promotion examinations, and for the entrance examinations to the Defence Services Staff College and Technical Staff College. Over the years, this has been a significant and well-received activity.

### USI Journal

The *USI Journal* is the oldest surviving defence journal in the country and in Asia, having first appeared in 1871. It is supplied free to all members, and in an era when there is a feeling that free expression of views by Defence personnel is not looked upon kindly by the establishment, the Journal in fact provides just such a forum, without regard to seniority and length of service in the Armed Forces, subject of course, to propriety and quality of the written work.

### Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation

The Erstwhile Centre for Research and its resources have been merged into the new Centre named as USI Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation (USI-CS3) wef 01 January 2005. The Centre aims at conducting detailed and comprehensive enquiry, research and analyses of national and international security related issues, and gaming and simulation of strategic scenarios, to evolve options for wider discussion and consideration.

### USI Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK)

The Centre was established in 2000 and functioned with USI till Aug 2014, when it moved out of USI premises and was delinked from USI. Its aims were organising workshops, seminars and training capsules for peace-keepers, observers and staff officers – both Indian and foreign. It also oversaw the practical training of Indian contingents. It functioned under a Board of Management headed by the Vice Chief of the Army Staff and worked in close coordination with the Service Headquarters and the Ministries of External Affairs and Defence. In August 2014, CUNPK moved out to the accommodation allotted by the Army HQ.

### Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR)

The Centre was established on 01 Dec 2000 and encourages study and research into the history of the Indian Armed Forces with objectivity, covering different facets such as strategy, tactics, logistics, organisation and socio-economic aspects and their implementation.

### Gold Medal Essay Competitions

Every year the Institution organises two gold medal essay competitions: one for officers below 10 years of service and the other open to all officers. These essays, the first one of which was introduced in 1871, constitute a barometer of opinion on matters that affect national security in general and the defence forces in particular.

### Lt Gen SL Menezes Memorial Essay Competition

This has been instituted from 2015 on a subject related to Armed Forces Historical Research. The Essay Competition is open to all across the globe.

### Lectures, Discussions and Seminars

A series of lectures, discussions and seminars on service matters, international affairs, and topics of general interest to the Services, are organised for the benefit of local members in Delhi.

### MacGregor Medal

This medal is awarded to Armed Forces personnel for valuable reconnaissance and adventure activity they may have undertaken.

## MEMBERSHIP

The following are eligible to become members of the Institution :

- Officers of the Armed Forces
- Class I Gazetted Officers of Group 'A' Central Services.
- Any category mentioned above will be eligible even though retired or released from the Service.
- Cadets from the NDA and Cadets from the Service Academies and Midshipmen.

For further particulars, please write to Director, USI of India, Rao Tula Ram Marg, (Opposite Signals Enclave) Post Bag No. 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi – 110 057